1963

Speeches Given Elsewhere

Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

Statement of Senator Mike Mansfield 3/29/63

March 29, 1963

The letter from former President Eisenhower to Congressman Hallack is another example of how well the former President and his administration managed the news and misled the people. Far from being a frugal budget balancing team the previous administration left five budget deficits in eight years, added $23 billion to the national debt, incurred the largest peace-time deficit ($12.4 billion in 1959) in history, and spent $182 billion more in its eight fiscal years than Truman did in the preceding eight.

This criticism of the Eisenhower administration is a criticism not of its budgets, but of its denial of the fact -- it is a criticism of the failure to recognize that a growing Nation and an industrious people need and can afford growing public services and a larger budget.

For the three fiscal years from July 1, 1958 through June 30, 1961, years for which the Eisenhower administration must take most of the responsibility, Federal budget expenditures rose by $10.1 billion, of which $5.2 billion was for defense, space, and interest and $4.9 billion was for all other functions of the Government. For the three years starting July 1, 1961, through President Kennedy's budget for the year ending June 30, 1964, the proposed increase in spending for governmental functions other than defense, space, and interest is less than $4.5 billion - about $1/2 billion less than Ike's last three years. On the otherhand, the increase for defense, space, and interest proposed by President Kennedy is substantially larger than in Ike's last three years - about two and one-third times as great. But then the previous administration may have

April 2, 1963

STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA)

For forty years, the Reader's Digest has been trying to save the public's reading time. And for almost as long, Harry Byrd has been trying to save the public's folding money.

Both the Digest and Senator Byrd are practitioners of the art of contraction, the one of excessive words, the other of excessive government spending. Both have been fighting a rear guard action for many years. Nevertheless, both have achieved the status of American institutions.

It was inevitable and appropriate that the two should come together at some point for an exchange of experiences in their separate but related functions in American life.

I cannot speak with authority on the techniques of word-economy, as practiced by the Digest. But I have more than a passing acquaintance with the techniques of fiscal economy as applied by the Senator from Virginia in the Senate of the United States.

It is easy enough to command attention by preaching fiscal economy in government. It is much more difficult to hold wide respect and affection while attempting to practice it. Yet, Harry Byrd has managed to achieve this synthesis and to maintain it through the years. What is his secret? His secret is that there is no secret. His public life is a faithful reflexion of his character and his beliefs.

Senator Byrd has invariably asserted his views with complete honesty and pursued them with dedicated persistence. And he has invariably recognized the right of every other American to do the same. Even as he believes firmly in his fiscal approach, he believes even more in the free processes by which we make the ultimate decisions in this nation.

In this Congress, as in all others in which I have served, such has been the hallmark of Senator Byrd. He has clashed many times with Presidents of both parties and with colleagues of both parties on fiscal policy. I have never known him to avoid these clashes; sometimes he has won; sometimes he has lost. But he has never failed to place his personal victories or defeats in the legislative process in the higher perspective of the national interest. That is why, beyond his dedication to government frugality, Senator Byrd evokes not only attention, but respect and affection from all his colleagues in the Senate. And that is why I am delighted to participate in this testimonial to his great service to the nation.

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REMARKS OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA)

DEDICATION OF EAST COAST MEMORIAL

NEW YORK, NEW YORK

May 23, 1963

It was not a long time ago, as time goes. It was scarcely twenty years ago when it all took place.

In the dawn and in the dusk and through the day, men and women went forth from this nation--to Africa, to Asia, to Europe, to the South Pacific, and to all the far places of the world. Week after week, they went, and month after month, and year after year.

Before it was done, eight million men and women in battle dress were outside the borders and, within, millions more were ready to go. And behind them, there was a nation with a whole people united in common purpose.

They came, these men and women in the Armed Forces, from the farms, the mines, the desks and the work benches. They came from slum and suburb, from country and town. They came from Utah and New York, from Puerto Rico and Georgia, from all the States and places in the land. They came from the long-rooted strains of Americans and from those so new that even the English language was still halting on the tongue. They came in all colors, all faiths, all creeds. And they were welcome in all colors, faiths and creeds.

Some came with fierce anger. Some came with cold hate. And some came with neither hate nor anger. Some knew why they came and some did not. Some came because they were told; and some because they told themselves.

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In the end, it did not matter who they were, what they were, what they did, where they had come from, or why. They became--all of them--the sinew and bone and muscle of a mighty arm of a nation. The nation's purpose was their purpose and it was they who bore the great costs and dangers of that purpose through the long years of the war.

A common human hope joined these Americans with others, with the English, with Russians, with Chinese, with Frenchmen and many more. And, in the end, this massive force swept, as a great wave, over the ramparts of the tyrants. It tore loose a deadly weight from the minds and backs of hundreds of millions and flung it into the cesspools of history.

And when this force had spent itself, for a brief moment, men and women throughout the world drank deeply of the meaning of peace and freedom. Many clutched that moment and held it. Many soon forgot or were compelled soon to forget.

And millions of those who had done so much to forge the moment were not there to live it when it came. Some had fought and died years before and some the day before. They had died in their homes or down the street or on the edge of town, against a wall, in a ditch, a courtyard or an open field. And others had died a long way from home, in an alien land, or against a vast sky or in the pitch-dark of the sea's depths.

Countless Americans were among those who did not see the bright flash of freedom and peace which swept the earth when the conflict ended. They died in all the places and in all the ways of war's death. Today, most of them lie here in the earth of America or in a plot apart in other

nations which is of this nation because they are there. But for others, we are not able to provide even a grave with a cross or a star to mark their last traces.

These are the missing. And it is they who have summoned us.

How much do we know of these missing men, we who stand here today? We know their names. We know the numbers they bore in the Army and Air Force, the Coast Guard, in the Navy and the Marines. But what do we really know of them? Do we know them as a wife, a mother, a father, a sister, brother or friend might know them? For those close to them, each life lost was as a star in a human universe, a star whose light was bright for awhile and then, in a moment, ceased to burn.

We cannot know that world, we who stand here, that closed but infinite world of each man's circle. What we can know, what all in this nation can know, and all the world's people should know, is that these deaths are a debt yet to be redeemed. And those whom we could not even bury are of its pledge.

Let us not delude ourselves. We do not pay the debt with these words today. We do not end it with these steles of granite pointed towards the sky nor with names struck upon stone.

We seek the words to praise these men and they are wanting. We search to express our thanks to these men and even the genius of the sculptor is not enough.

The debt remains unpaid. What we do and say here today is not needed by these men whom we honor. It is needed by ourselves. It is needed to remind us that the debt is unpaid. For these men whose names we record, and the countless others throughout the world whose passing was marked or unmarked, did not die for words of praise or memorials of stone. They died that those who lived might have a chance to build this nation strong and wise in justice and in equity for all, in a world free, at last, from the tyrants of fear, hate and oppression.

It was a long time ago, as time goes, that they died. It was not twenty years but fifty years ago or a century or a millenium. For they died, not only on the Normandy Beachhead but at Verdun, at Gettysburg, at Valley Forge and in all the places and in all the times that the human right to be human has been redeemed.

If we would honor these dead, then--all of them--if we would praise them, if we would repay them, let us ask ourselves what we have done with this chance which they have given us. And let us ask ourselves again and again what we have done until there is, in this nation and in this world, the need to ask it no longer.

COMMENCEMENT ADDRESS

of

SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD

MAJORITY LEADER, UNITED STATES SENATE

MISSOULA COUNTY HIGH SCHOOL

MISSOULA, MONTANA

Wednesday, June 5, 1963 - 8 p.m.

I am grateful to you men and women of the graduating class for giving me this opportunity to be a part of your commencement. It is a special privilege for me because, as you may know, I never graduated from high school.

I left school--dropped out, as they say nowadays--at an early age. And it was many years before I accumulated enough good sense to go back. By that time it was too late for a regular high school education. I managed to make up the scholastic requirements while working in the mines in Butte and attending Montana State University. This was made possible because of the time and effort which the teachers of Butte High School, Missoula County High School and Montana State University so generously gave to help me to make up the high school entrance units necessary to become a regular student in the last quarter of my senior year at Montana. Above all, it was made possible by my wife, Maureen Hayes Mansfield, who was then on the faculty of Butte High School and who was the source of the inspiration, the courage and the determination which I needed to achieve the goal of a high school graduate even though it was without the privilege of a graduation.

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I have always felt a sense of loss--a kind of gap in my life--at never having experienced what you graduates are now experiencing. It seems to me that a high school commencement is a unique and wonderful moment. It is a time to remember achievements as well as disappointments. It is a time to remember your efforts and your faculty's efforts to open new doors for your development. It is a time to remember the warmth of the friendships which you have made and which I know you hope to keep. It is a time to remember the understanding and encouragement and, yes, the anxieties of your parents and relatives and friends who have shared these years with you.

It is--a commencement--a moment to telescope the experiences of the preceding years and to fix for all time in memory what is now a unique segment of your past. And it is--a commencement--a moment to recognize that the curtains of the future are opening once again on a new setting, even as they did when you entered high school and, further back, when you set foot in school for the first time.

If you think about it, you will realize that each time the curtains have opened in this way on a new phase you have been more fully equipped by your accumulated experience and education to assume a greater responsibility for making your own way. At the same time, each phase has brought new possibilities, new challenges and new uncertainties.

At a moment like this, I am sure that each of you has his own thoughts and feelings about the future. They are individual and personal. And I would not presume to intrude, except to urge you to include in them a determination to continue to seek education in college or wherever else may be appropriate for you.

But there is one thing about the future which is not personal, which you will share in the years ahead. That is the kind of community and nation and world in which you live. It is the setting which you will have in common but within which each of you will develop in your own individual way. This setting has great meaning for you, whether you realize it or not. You may try to ignore it but I assure you that it will not ignore you. It will color and influence your personal lives in countless ways and for better or worse.

The dominant characteristic of this setting in which we live is change. That is the case now and it is likely to remain so for a long time to come. There is nothing new about change. President Kennedy said recently: "Everything changes but change itself." Heraclitus noted much the same thing 2,500 years ago when he wrote: "There is nothing permanent except change."

Change has been at work since the dawn of existence. It has been at work in the world, in the nation and in our State and community. If you want to appreciate its significance fully and vividly, may I suggest that you look again at some of Charlie Russell's paintings. The artist has not put on canvas figments of his imagination. He has held up the mirror of his talent to life as it was lived in this State less than a hundred years ago. Compare a Russell painting with what you have known in growing up in Missoula and you will have a rough measure of the changes which have taken place in your immediate setting or environment in the short span of less than a century.

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Take another measure for the changes which have occurred in the nation. Montana was admitted to the Union in 1889 as the 41st State. Even as the number of States has expanded to fifty, their boundaries have been stretched across 2,000 miles of water to Hawaii and north to Alaska and the Arctic Circle. In 1889 when Montana became a State, the United States was at peace with all nations abroad. The Armed Forces totaled 40,000 men, virtually all of whom were in garrisons within the continental limits. Today, the United States is also, in a strict interpretation of the word, at peace. But today, there are two and a half million men and women in uniform. Another million men and women work as civilians in the Defense Establishment in order to keep these Armed Services in a state of readiness. Four hundred thousand men and women of the Armed Services are stationed in Western Europe. That, alone, is ten times greater than the entire number when Montana became a State. And many more thousands are in the Western Pacific and elsewhere in the world.

Take still other measures for the changes in the world. A quarter of a century ago--say, in 1935--almost all of Africa and much of Asia was in a state of political dependency on Western Europe. These areas were, for the most part, passive colonial regions with little direct influence or voice in what was transpiring elsewhere in the world. Today, all of Asia and most of Africa are composed--as you well know--of independent nations with varying degrees of influence and a most emphatic voice in the affairs of the world.

A quarter of a century ago, in 1935, the United States exported to the rest of the world, products and services of one kind or another worth $2.3 billion and imported $2 billion. In 1962, we exported $21.6 billion and imported $16.4 billion.

A quarter of a century ago, the United States was concerned most about the great depression from which it had not yet emerged. If the United States thought at all about its security in the world, it was a concern prompted by the rapid growth of militarism in Germany, Japan and Italy and, with it, a deepening hostility to the United States. Twenty-five years later we have prosperity in the United States although it is uneven and States such as our own have not shared fully in it. But the attention of the entire nation is not focused today as it once was on economic questions within our borders. The predominant concern has been with national security and with Communism, as practiced in Russia or China or Cuba, or as it might be pursued in the United States.

A quarter of a century ago, the peak of unconquered Mount Everest--29,000 feet in the clouds--beckoned to the adventurous. Today the moon--239,000 miles in space--has been brought by science and technology into the range of the daring.

What I have cited are but a few dramatic indications of the kinds of change which our community-state, nation and world have undergone, within the lifetime of some present today. Indeed, the older people here can add any number of other contrasts to the list out of their personal experiences.

As I noted, change is not a new factor in human existence. Yet the change of our times is different from what has gone before. It differs in velocity. And it differs in range--in the great range of human activity in which it applies. The net result is that each of us as an individual has trouble trying to keep up with it, and, even,more, in trying to exercise control over its influence on us. For it is the kind of change which, whether we wish it or not, intrudes deeply and persistently in our personal lives.

Speaking for myself, I must confess in all honesty that I could do with a little less change and a little slower pace. But that is a kind of wishful thinking. There is no stopping the world, even if we would want to get off.

The fact is that the forces which are producing this change of our times are immense and universal. If they are not very controlable by individuals they are not much more controlable by any individual community or State or, indeed, by any individual nation. Rather than to look back wistfully at the past, then, we have no choice but to live with the present and do what we can--each of us in his own way--to help the community-state and the nation to shape the future for the greatest possible well-being of those who live today and will live in emerging generations in this changing setting. And if we are to do this, we have got to grasp clearly, in our understanding, the major forces which are compelling the change, the unique change of our times.

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In this connection, there is, first, the force of population growth. In our own State it is somewhat difficult to appreciate the significance of this factor. We have a relatively small population and a great expanse of territory. Yet even in Montana, population has grown in a half century from 370,000 in 1910 to about 700,000. In the same time span, the population of the nation has increased from 92 million to almost 190 million and that of the world has exploded from one and a half billion to three billion.

The city of Missoula itself is a microcosm of this change. Its population in 1910 was 12,000; today it is, as you know, about 27,000. Or to take an extreme case, note that the land area of Japan is about that of Montana. But in Japan, there are now close to 100 million people as compared with the 700,000 in our State.

It is not a question of whether this growth in population is a good trend or a bad trend. The main point is that it has occurred. It is a reality which lies at the root of many of the other changes which confront us.

While numbers have greatly increased, people, today, no less than fifty years ago, obviously still require food and water, clothing, shelter, good health and recreation. That requirement has not changed very much, despite the calorie-counting and the Metrecal. But there are twice as many people in the world requiring these necessities. Add the increase in numbers to the universal pursuit of higher standards of living, that is, of more and more things and services and you will have some measure of the pressure for change which has resulted.

In spite of these vast achievements, it is obvious that the problem of supplying the needs of an ever-expanding human population has not yet been adequately met. It is a fact that tens of millions of people throughout the world--in Asia and Africa, particularly--live from hand to mouth, never far from the borderline of starvation. It is a fact that even in our own country, millions of citizens do not have a sufficient supply of life's necessities as we presently define these necessities. It is a fact that adequate medical care is not available to many Americans--notably older people and that hundreds of millions throughout the world have only the rudiments, if that, of what science can provide in the way of health safeguards. It is a fact that many of our great and expanding urban centers and even our smaller cities are rushing head-long into a most serious problem of pure water supply, a scarcity of accessible recreational facilities and countless other difficulties associated largely with population concentration.

The growth of population and the expanding concept of the standard of living have been major factors in setting in motion still another stimulus to the change of our times. The world not only has to supply a vastly increased amount of goods and services but, in order to do so, it has to bring people and raw materials from great distances to produce them and it has to distribute the finished products over vast distances. This has led to a scientific and technological revolution in transportation and communications. We are now--in this State--in almost simultaneous communication with every other part of the nation and world. Indeed, if there were radio receivers--as we know them--on Venus, we could communicate with that planet. Major Cooper's recent flight

resulted among other things, in clear photographs of thousands of square miles of the earth's surface in a single shot. Telstar, the communications satellite, cast the TV story of his flight simultaneously in the United States and Europe.

Insofar as transportation is concerned, we can sense the immensity of the change by noting that half-a-century ago there was a total of about 500,000 motor vehicles in the United States and not too many roads fit to carry them any great distance. Today, there are 75 million vehicles and the States are knit together with an intricate and growing system of super-highways. Nor is this change confined to the United States. Throughout Western Europe, in Latin America, and in Tokyo and many other Asian and African cities the automobile is now omnipresent. And this symbol of the rapid and vast movement of peoples will become, no doubt, universal in the near future.

Motor vehicles, of course, are only a part of the story. To cite another of many changes, commercial jets flying various national flags, as you know, cross the oceans countless times a day and in a matter of hours. And, ironically, in some of the more remote parts of the world, these planes are serviced by locally trained and expert mechanics who have never seen a train.

Now these changes, and others like them, add up to a high degree of human contact and interdependency. It is, moreover, an ever-increasing contact and interdependency between the peoples of communities and the States, and significantly, between the peoples of many nations. Scarcely

a century ago a trip of fifty miles was a major expedition requiring at least a day in many parts of the nation. People now drive that distance each morning to work and again at night in returning home. A century ago, neighbors were the people who lived next door or at most, in the next town. It is commonplace now to cross the six or seven thousand miles of the Pacific in less than a day. And our neighbors are not only those close at hand but, in effect, people anywhere in the nation or in the world.

With this expanding contact has come, inevitably, not only the interchange of goods and services but also the transmission of ideas throughout the nation and the world. And one idea has been significant beyond all others: the idea of equal human worth and equal opportunity. This idea, may I say, receives its finest expression in the Declaration of Independence and in the Constitution and it represents one of the great contributions of this nation to the people of the entire world. It is not, however, a placid idea. At times, it has brought strife and struggle to many other peoples, even as it did to the Thirteen Colonies. At times, it has produced excess, confusion, chaos and disappointment at home as well as abroad.

After more than a century and a half and a great Civil War we are still perfecting the practice of the concept for all of our citizens. And as you have seen in recent weeks, we are sometimes brought, by the process, to the edge or over the edge of violence. That alone should induce an appropriate humility and would suggest that we be most patient with those abroad who have had far less experience with this idea, this ideal of equal human worth and equal opportunity.

But let there be no doubt of its fundamental validity. Even as it is for ourselves, it is valid for all mankind. Even as this ideal was valid at the time of the American Revolution it is valid in our own time and in the time which is yet to come. Indeed, you may count on it being very much in the forefront of world developments throughout your lifetime.

As a final major characteristic of the change of our times, I would point out that the contact among peoples and among nations during the past quarter of a century has also brought with it one great negative result. It has brought an increase in human hostility. Whatever the compound of fear, lack of understanding, aggressiveness and arrogance which has produced this hostility, it is a most dangerous phenomenon. To be sure, hostility is not unique to the contemporary world. The Indians and the early settlers knew it--one of the other--and cattlemen, sheep-herders and homesteaders knew it, one of the others. The States have known it in the past and still, to some degree, know it. Nations have been fighting wars because of it from the beginning of history.

But what gives hostility its immense importance in our times is what it implies in a heavily populated world, in an intimately interconnected world, and in a world in which science and technology have developed, in response to it, military weapons of quick and overwhelming devastation.

Almost since the end of World War II we have lived continuously on the brink of World War III. Time and again and, most recently, in connection with Cuba, the world has looked into the abyss of the destruction of civilization as we have known it. No nation, whether it be Free, Communist or whatever, is immune to this threat to civilized survival. Nor is any area within any nation secure from it.

We have lived for so many years with this situation that we have tended to become mentally callousad to it. But I would remind you that here in this State, there is a missile complex centered on Malmstrom Air Force Base in Great Falls. It is equipped with devices which can carry immense destruction thousands of miles in a matter of minutes. And I would remind you, too, that these devices are there because scarcely 3,000 or 4,000 miles away--and I refer not to Cuba but to sites to the north and west--there are similar devices, aimed in this direction, which are perfectly capable of destroying most of the life in Montana in a matter of minutes.

I do not mention these matters to frighten or to startle you. They are simply some of the major facts of our times and I have spoken frankly to you of them because you are mature enough to understand and appreciate the truth. I have every confidence that in the future which now belongs largely to you, you will be able to grasp this situation and deal effectively with it. It is the way of our civilization to pass on to each succeeding generation not only its accumulated achievements but also the accumulated errors. We do so with the hope and conviction that the successors will be better equipped in understanding to be able to rectify some of the latter and leave the world a better place in which to live.

I do not know your individual plans and hopes and expectations. But I do know that whatever they may be you will have a greater chance for realizing them, as you are equipped to understand and to live with the realities of the community-state, nation and world which we share.

That is why I stressed to you earlier the importance of continued education in college or wherever else may be suitable. Education is one of the great keys to the future, not only to the future of mankind but to your individual futures. It will help you to see the setting in which you live--to see it, not in bits and pieces, but to see it whole--the good and the bad, the limits and the possibilities, the costs as well as the benefits. And it will help you to understand why the minute hand of the clock of history cannot be isolated and turned back while the hour hand moves forward relentlessly.

May I suggest to you, too, that no matter where your paths may lead--and in this world of change they can lead very far away indeed--that you do not forget the roots of home and community. For it is from these roots that you have grown to manhood and womanhood and from these roots you will continue to draw strength and stability throughout your days.

You will need that strength. For it is a complex and difficult world which has closed in on us all. But with that strength and with what you yourselves will add to it out of your own capacities you will have what you need to shape your own lives successfully and to contribute your share to the building of a more peaceful and satisfactory house for the human family in this community and State, in the nation and in the world.

I want to take this opportunity, finally, to salute each of you personally, to thank you for the contribution which, whether you realize it or not, you have already made to the rest of us and to wish you the best of everything in the future. I know that you will have your feet on the ground

even as you join with the rest of the world in the great delving into and exploration of what lies in the heavens and the stars beyond. And wherever you go and in whatever you do, may God be with you.

For Immediate Release
Sept 6, 1963

August 13, 1963

STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA)

CHINESE-RUSSIAN CONVERGENCE IN ASIA

Mr. President:

There are obvious reasons of health and skyrocketing costs of armaments which provide common or parallel motives for the Soviet Union and the United States to have sought the Test Ban Treaty. Beyond the obvious, other interests have undoubtedly entered into the search for agreement by each nation. These are not necessarily shared interests but nevertheless they are a part of the calculations of the balance of benefit on which the Treaty rests.

It seems to me that the Senate should explore all of these factors in an effort to understand fully what is at stake in the act of ratification. Reference, for example, has already been made in the hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee to the growing estrangement between Russia and China. That the question has been raised suggests an awareness of what may be a most significant factor in the Soviet position on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Yet our knowledge of the Russian-Chinese estrangement is too limited to permit a full comprehension of its implications either for Soviet policy or our own. For one thing, our reportorial coverage of the U.S.S.R., particularly east of the Urals, is extremely limited and spasmodic. For another, our knowledge of what is transpiring in China comes to us largely second- or third-hand.

It is understandable, therefore, that the Sino-Soviet estrangement has been analyzed in the press and elsewhere largely in theoretical terms. Scholars, journalists and intelligence ... technicians pore over the documentation and statements and reports which emanate from Russia and China. And in this fashion, the estrangement is interpreted to the nation almost wholly in terms of ideological differences and the struggle to claim the high-priesthood of orthodoxy in the international Communist movement and with it, I suppose, the right to preach the eulogy at the burial of Capitalism.

These ideological factors are undoubtedly deeply involved and I would not for a moment underestimate them. But if I may be so bold as to suggest it, it seems to me that the great emphasis which is given to them in the information which reaches the government and the public may produce a serious distortion of our concept of the actual situation. We may see the problem largely as a clash of Marxist theories or Communist personalities which is destined to disappear as soon as the theories are straightened out or the present leaders, in time, go the way of all leaders.

I should like to suggest that other, more mundane and enduring considerations are involved in present Sino-Soviet difficulties, considerations which will not easily be exorcised either by new theories or new leaders.

It is to one of these considerations that I direct the attention of the Senate today. It may well be the most significant factor, in the Russian-Chinese estrangement, largely overlooked in the overwhelming emphasis which has been given to the ideological differences between Moscow and Peking. I refer to the geographic and cultural convergence of Russia and China in the inner recesses of the Asian continent.

This convergence, Mr. President, has been a source of intermittent friction between the two countries for a very long time. It has persisted irrespective of the ideological inclinations of Moscow and Peking at any given time in history. It long predates the advent of Communism in China and even Russia. Indeed, it predates the birth of Karl Marx by at least a century.

The first recorded clashes between Russians and Chinese go back to the 17th century. Three hundred years ago, Russian traders and Cossacks first made contact with the outposts of Chinese-Manchu imperial power in the region north of Manchuria. The early zone of Russian influence and authority in this desolate northeast corner of Asia, as against China, was established by a series of treaties beginning with that of Nerchinsk in 1689, and followed by Bur and Kiakhta in 1727, Kiakhta in 1768, and the Kiakhta protocol in 1792. A half-century later the Russian press southeastward was resumed under Count Nikolai Muraviev-Amursky, the Governor General of Eastern Siberia, and his chief military aid, Captain Gennadii Ivanovich Nevelskoi. Again there followed a consolidation of the Russian position, in the Treaty of Aigun of 1858. This agreement brought into Russian possession large areas of Northeast Asia which had previously been under Manchu control.

Subsequently, Russia as well as other European powers and Japan exacted by guile, bribery or naked power, special economic privileges and territorial concessions from weak and corrupt imperial officials of China. By this process, the Russians penetrated south into Manchuria, establishing themselves at Dairen and Port Arthur on the Yellow Sea by the end of the 19th century and penetrating Korea which had been for a long time in a tributary relationship with Peking.

Since that high-water mark, Russian influence in Northeast Asia at the expense of China has fluctuated. In the face of a Japanese advance and the weakness of the early Soviet state, it receded. Under the Communism of Stalin it advanced once more at the end of World War II. And under the Communism of Khrushchev it receded once more after the Chinese Communists came to power in Peking.

Our sources of information are insufficient to provide a clear delineation of where the present line of convergence may lie, as between Russian and Chinese influence in Northeast Asia. We are not even sure of what the precise situation in this connection may be in Korea where we are deeply involved, let alone in Manchuria, of which we know very little. One thing is reasonably certain, however, the actual Russian-Chinese conversion does not bear much relationship to the border-demarcations as shown on ordinary maps. It is also clear, in any event, that the convergence in the Northeast is still much further south and east of any line which would have been recognized by a Ching emperor of the Manchu Dynasty in the 17th century, the 18th or early 19th century.

The recent history of the Chinese-Russian convergence in Northeast Asia has been affected, of course, by the appearance of Communist ideology in Russia and China. But sufficient experience is now accumulated to suggest that the future history of the region will hardly be dominated by this factor.

And the history of the Northeast, a history of Russian advance and recession and advance--sometimes warlike and imperious and sometimes peaceful and conciliatory--finds parallels elsewhere in Central Asia. During the last century, for example, Mongolia was entirely under nominal Chinese sovereignty. It was largely the efforts of Russians under the Czars coupled with the weakness of the later Manchu-Ching emperors which

brought about a loosening of Chinese control over the vast stretches of land now identified as the Outer Mongolian People's Republic. And it was largely the same combination of Soviet strength and Chinese weakness under the Chinese National Republic which resulted in 1922, in the establishment of an Outer Mongolia, not only independent of China but brought progressively into a relationship, apparently in the nature of a protectorate, with the U.S.S.R.

South and west of Outer Mongolia we find in Sinkiang the same flow, ebb and flow of Russian influence. Here, as elsewhere there was for centuries a tradition of Chinese suzerainty over small principalities of tribal peoples. But here as elsewhere this suzerainty has been quite devoid of significance in the absence of strong Chinese central power to assert it. Thus, in the last century, the Southwest edges of Sinkiang were chipped away and added to what is now the contiguous territory of the U.S.S.R. And even as recently as World War II the Russians exercised for a time something close to indirect domination over principal trading centers and caravan junctions in Sinkiang.

Especially, since the advent of Chinese Communist control over the mainland, the line of convergence as between Russia and China in the Sinkiang area has apparently been pushed back westward once again. But how far and how firm this recession of Soviet influence has been, we do not really know with any degree of accuracy.

To recapitulate, Mr. President, I have sought to point out to the Senate, that, historically, there has been not a fixed but a shifting and uncertain line of convergence between Russia and China in the inner recesses of the Asian continent. This line, Mr. President, is not necessarily the border as shown on contemporary maps but rather the changing extremity of

the eastward and southward reach of Russian influence and the westernmost and northernmost extension of enforceable Chinese control.

Further, history indicates that while there have been periods of stalemate and recession, the over-all pattern in the region for several centuries was that of Russian advance. It was an advance which paralleled roughly the spastic but steady decay of the Manchu-Ching dynasty through the reigns of a number of emperors. And it drew strength from the debilitation of the successor Chinese Republic in World War II and the collapse of the Japanese intrusion on the Asian mainland in that conflict.

What prompts me to make these observations at this time, Mr. President, is that they may be of more than historic interest in the light of the present Sino-Soviet estrangement. This break comes at a time when there has emerged in Peking once again, a strong centralization of Chinese power. To be sure, the government which wields this power proclaims its Marxism. Indeed, it claims to be more Marxist than Moscow. Yet insofar as Chinese Marxism is expressed in practice on the borders of China, it appears to bear a remarkable resemblance to classic Chinese dynastic policy.

There are strong indications, for example, that the present Chinese government is not disposed to regard any of its borders--at least none fixed after the time of the advanced decay of the Ching Dynasty--as permanently constricting on the outward extension of its power. That such is the case is indicated by the Chinese assertion in Korea, in Viet Nam, in Laos, in Tibet and beyond Tibet into Ladakh and the Northeast Frontier Agency at the two extremities of the Indian sub-continent.

What, then, of the Sino-Soviet border regions? Are these, too, to be affected by the reassertion of Chinese power? I have already referred to the recession of Soviet influence in Manchuria and Sinkiang, although

to what extent and how voluntarily it has occurred, we do not know with any degree of precision. But whatever its extent, it would be a relatively minor recession should the Chinese assertion against the U.S.S.R., in time, parallel its policies with regard to Korea, Southeast Asia and the Chinese-Indian border region. If there is this parallel then the Chinese claim against the U.S.S.R. could conceivably extend out of Sinkiang, through the Soviet Pamirs to Afghanistan. It could also embrace all of Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Maritime Provinces along the Pacific. For these areas fell within the reach of Manchu China in the heyday of the dynasty.

It is interesting to note in this connection, Mr. President, that when Mr. Khrushchev, late last year, taunted the Chinese Communists for accepting the presence of colonialists in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao while urging him to act against the United States, he was answered in an editorial on March 8 in the Chinese People's Daily and Red Flag which reads in part as follows: "During the hundred or so years preceding the victorious Chinese Revolution, the colonial and imperialistic powers--the USA, Great Britain, France, Czarist Russia, Germany, Japan, Italy, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal--became unreservedly engaged in a campaign of aggression against China. They imposed on the various regimes of the old China numerous unequal treaties: The Treaty of Nanking in 1842; the Treaty of Aigun in 1858; the Treaty of Tsientsin in 1858; the Treaty of Peking in 1860; the Treaty of Ili in 1881; the Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong in 1898; the Treaty of 1901; etc.... By virtue of these unequal treaties, they annexed Chinese territory in the North, South, East and West; or they caused territories to be ceded to them on lease along the coast of China and even in the Chinese hinterland.... When the People's Republic of China was founded in 1949, our Government clearly stated its

intention of eventually re-examining all the treaties concluded by previous Chinese regimes with foreign governments and, according to their respective texts, either recognizing, denouncing, revising or renegotiating them at the appropriate time."

Note, Mr. President, the reference in this catalogue of unequal treaties to the Treaty of Aigun which fixed the present-day boundaries in Manchuria at China's expense and to Russia's advantage. And note in conjunction therewith this paragraph in the same editorial: "Certain persons (an obvious reference to Mr. Khrushchev) would like us to raise the question of the unequal treaties here and now.... Have they realized what the consequences of this might be?"

The implication is clear, Mr. President. The Chinese regard certain Soviet territories no less than Hong Kong and Macao and Formosa as having been taken inequitably from China and subject, therefore, to Chinese claim.

Now, Mr. President, I do not wish to leave the impression that China is about to embark upon a general war with Russia to bring back into the historic embrace of Peking, certain lands along the inner Asian borders. But I do suggest that the arrow-tips of Chinese influence are already pointed outward from Peking into these sparsely inhabited regions whose predominant population is neither Chinese nor Russian but Mongol and other tribal peoples. Many techniques are already apparently operating to this end including the Chinese aid-programs in Outer Mongolia and the organization of autonomous tribal groupings on Chinese territory. Certainly such limited information as we have with respect to the region hint at the likelihood that the Chinese arrows have begun to prick the Russians in these remote regions.

I would suggest further, Mr. President, that Soviet foreign policy is not formed in ignorance of these recent developments or the history which I have just recounted, or of the actions of the Chinese in Southeast Asia and on the Indian border. And there is no reason to assume that because it is Communist, Russian foreign policy is concerned any less with such considerations than might be the case with the foreign policy of any other nation.

I would suggest, finally, that it is becoming apparent that we have been in error in assuming for so long that the iron-hand of Moscow was so unshakeably fixed on Peking that it had superceded all other factors for all time in the considerations of the Communist leaders in China. Theoretical Communist world unity, whatever its weight, has not replaced certain enduring factors in the relationships of Russia and China as they are indicated to us by history.

And one of these factors, perhaps, the most significant, as I have tried to explain to the Senate today, is the convergence of Russian and Chinese influence in the vast inner recesses of Asia. The problems which are posed by the convergence are not essentially those of Marxist theory. And they certainly are not those of a common border dispute, that is, whether to move the markers a few yards or a few miles in one direction or the other. What is involved is the ultimate disposition and utilization of a reserve of millions of square miles of territory,largely devoid of human habitation.

This land and its contents constitute an enormous and largely unexplored and unexploited resource. Heretofore, it may have been of minor importance because of the inadequacies in techniques of modern development and transportation, particularly in that part of the world. But with the rapid dissemination and multiplication of these techniques, the region

grows rapidly in significance to the two great peoples which converge upon it. And it grows, too, in significance, as the population of China, already in the vicinity of 700 millions, expands explosively and presses ever more heavily on limited resources even for a bare minimum of food, clothing and shelter.

So, Mr. President, if we wish to understand fully the motives of the Soviet Union in seeking a nuclear test ban treaty, we ought not to overlook the factor of the Sino-Soviet convergence, a factor which is clearly indicated by history but which cannot be weighed accurately without a better understanding of what is presently transpiring in interior Asia.

In any event, it would be unwise to dismiss the likelihood of a growth of tension at various points of contact along the thousands of miles of this vague frontier. Some might anticipate with relish the prospects of these clashes, even if they were nuclear. That prospect might be bent and twisted, I suppose, into an argument against the proposed Treaty to ban nuclear tests.

But that, Mr. President, would be a most distorted view of nuclear realities and contemporary international relations. For, if the flames of a great nuclear conflagration are lit, it will matter little who holds the match or where in the world it is struck. Even the vastness of Central Asia would be insufficient to contain the holocaust or to confine it to the two massive Communist powers of Eurasia. No, Mr. President, the probability of increasing tension in the Sino-Soviet convergence, as in the case of all significant international tensions, is one more reason for seeking to bring about rational control over the growth and spread of the immense destructive power of nuclear weapons.

Rather than an argument against this Treaty, then, this probable tension in Sino-Soviet relations is an argument for this nation to seek to improve its comprehension of the actual situation which exists in Central Asia. For that region and what transpires in it is likely to have a most profound significance in a world in which the peace and security of this nation is closely interwoven with that of all others.

Hold for Release at Noon
Wednesday, Sept. 4, 1963

STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA)

NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY

Mr. President:

For several weeks, the Senate has had the proposed Treaty on Nuclear Testing. The question has been examined intensively not only by the Committee on Foreign Relations but also by members of the Armed Services Committee and the Senate members of the Committee on Atomic Energy, all of whom were invited to participate in the hearings.

There has been in process, in short, a very thorough Senate consideration of the proposed Treaty. The specific questions have already been asked and answered, as far as it has been possible to answer them. The specific doubts have been raised and, as far as possible, laid to rest.

We are now approaching a point at which we must put the penultimate question in solitary conscience. It is this decision which will produce the final vote by which the Senate will either give or withhold consent to ratification of the proposed Treaty.

The issue now is not whether Germany mistrusts the Treaty or France mistrusts it more or Communist China most of all.

The issue, now, is not solely the meaning of the Treaty for health and human genetics, or for military strategy or for the technology and costs of scientific arms-competition.

All these issues and others have been considered in the painstaking interrogation of the past few weeks. Each has its own unique significance. But each is a fragment of the penultimate question and must be so regarded if we are to reach sound decision.

For the question which now confronts us is the one question which is the sum of the many questions. And a rational response to it can only be the sum of the many responses, weighed in the scale of such wisdom and judgment as each of us may possess. The attitude of no single expert or group of experts in or out of government, no single official or group of officials of this government, no single scientist or group of scientists can be controlling on this question. The question is for us alone to decide. It is not for any scientist, military leader, cabinet secretary or whatever to decide for us. It remains now for elected Senators to decide for themselves, to confirm or refuse to confirm the judgment of an elected President.

This penultimate question which confronts us is simply stated: Does the proposed Treaty serve, on balance, the interests of the people of the United States, when those interests are considered in their totality? Or to put it negatively: Is the proposed Treaty, on balance, inimical to the interests of the people of the United States?

If it is inimical, obviously, the President should not have had the Treaty signed in the first place and, certainly, the Senate should not now consent to its ratification. But if the Treaty passes even a minimal test, if reason tells us that, on balance, the Treaty is not inimical to this nation, then that alone would seem to be sufficient grounds for approving it. For if we mean what we say when we speak of supporting the leadership of the President, irrespective of party, in his great national responsibilities in foreign relations, we must mean, at least, that in matters of this kind, we are inclined to give him the benefit of those vague and residual hesitancies by which each of us in his own way may be possessed.

And may I add, Mr. President, that I do not see how any Senator can vote either for or against this Treaty with a sense of absolute assurance. In any major essay in foreign relations there are bound to be hesitancies. They would be there if we debated the proposed Treaty or any major issue, a month, a year or a decade.

There were doubts and hesitancies when a Republican Congress voted a Marshall Plan under a Democratic President. There were doubts and hesitancies when a Democratic Congress voted a Middle East Resolution under a Republican President. The doubts are there year in and year out when Congress considers the foreign aid program. For the simple truth is that there are no certainties, no absolutes in significant matters of foreign relations.

Indeed, were there no doubts on this question of a nuclear test ban that in itself would be cause for the deepest concern. For the absence of any doubt would suggest either a dangerous delusion or an insipid insignificance in the Treaty.

The truth is that there are risks in this as in any venture in foreign relations. But I remind the Senate that there are also risks in failing to venture, in standing still in a world which does not stand still for us or any nation. And at this moment in the world's time, the risks of a paralyzed uncertainty may be far greater than those which might stem from the pursuit of this venture.

Indeed, there is a strong presumption that such must be the case. I say that, Mr. President, because this proposed Treaty is no instant fancy, no sudden concoction. We have not arrived in haste at this point of decision. The active pursuit of a Treaty to ban nuclear tests began many years ago under the Administration of President Eisenhower. The previous administration was not passive and negative in its approach. It sought a

treaty in a most active and positive fashion. Indeed, the former Vice President journeyed to Moscow in 1959 in an effort to further this objective, among others, of United States foreign policy. And in a letter dated April 13, 1959, President Eisenhower wrote Mr. Khrushchev that: "The United States strongly seeks a lasting agreement for the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests." Note, Mr. President, the phrase "strongly seeks."

In short, Mr. President, the search for a nuclear test ban treaty was clearly a cardinal element in the foreign policy of the nation during the second Eisenhower Administration. When Mr. Kennedy assumed office, he did not have to continue that search. He could have abandoned it. He could have ignored the efforts of the previous Administration. He could have turned his back on the affirmations in favor of a nuclear test ban treaty, as they were contained in the platforms of both parties during the 1960 Presidential campaign and upon which Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Nixon stood for office. That is a prerogative of the Presidency and Mr. Kennedy could have exercised it had he judged, after a full examination of relevant information, that the policy was detrimental to the interests of the nation.

But Mr. Kennedy did not so find. On the contrary, he pursued the matter even as Mr. Eisenhower had done before him. And he continued to pursue it, in spite of repeated set-backs and frustrations not unlike those undergone by his predecessor, until an agreement was, at last, initialed by his distinguished agent, the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Averell Harriman on July 25, 1963. That agreement, I would note in order to emphasize its non-partisan nature, is more closely in accord with the concept of a nuclear test ban as it is contained in the Republican Party's Presidential Platform in 1960 than it is with the similar plank in the Democratic Party's Platform.

It is conceivable that one President of the United States may have misjudged the American interest in this highly significant matter although I do not for a moment suggest that such was the case with President Eisenhower. But I find it most difficult to believe that two Presidents in succession would be guilty of negligence or poor judgment on precisely the same question of national interest. No, Mr. President, there is a strong presumption that a test ban treaty is not only not inimiial to the interests of the people of the nation but is to their positive advantage.

Further, Mr. President, when members of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services and the Senate members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy probe every word, comma and period of the text of the Treaty, when they examine every conceivable implication of the Treaty for days on end, when they hear countless relevant witnesses of the Executive Branch, including the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Director of the C.I.A. give sober but unmistakable support for this Treaty, when the committees summon for testimony not only the advocates of this Treaty but its most articulate competent opponents--in short, when the treaty is subjected to the most stringent Senate Committee scrutiny and the great preponderance of informed testimony is favorable, there is a strong presumption that the Treaty is in the positive interests of the United States.

And yet, Mr. President, a strong presumption is not enough in a matter of this kind. Each Senator has an individual responsibility to examine this Treaty for himself in the light of his own conscience and his own concept of the interests of his state and the nation.

The Senator from Montana has done so. And having done so, he is persuaded that the proposed Treaty does no violence to but, on the contrary, serves the interests of the people of his state and the nation.

It serves those interests, immediately and tangibly, in matters of public health as they may involve a resident or a child yet to be born in Montana or in anyone of the fifty states. I refer, Mr. President, to the question of radiation which, as an uninvited but ever-present spectator, has haunted these hearings of the last few weeks. To be sure, there may be a lack of certainty among scientists and doctors on the precise effects of man-made radiation on health and the human species. But let there be no mistake about it. There is a minimal concept of the dangers of radiation from which reputable scientific and medical opinion does not depart. It is expressed very clearly in the unanimous report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Facts of Atomic Radiation, 17th Session of the General Assembly, 1962. In this report, scientists from 15 nations, including France, the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Canada recorded their unanimous agreement that:

> "The exposure of mankind to radiation from increasing numbers of artificial sources including the worldwide contamination of the environment with short and long-lived radio-nuclides from weapons tests calls for the closest attention particularly because the effects of any increase in radiation exposure may not be fully manifested for several decades in the case of somatic disease and for many generations in the case of genetic damage. There should be no misunderstanding about the reality of genetic damage from radiation. The Committee therefore emphasizes the need that all forms of unnecessary radiation exposure should be minimized or avoided entirely, particularly when the exposure of large populations is entailed."

Mr. President, so far as I am aware, that statement has not been challenged from a reputable medical or scientific source anywhere in the world. It is a most conservative statement and one must question the sobriety of anyone who would pass off the factor of radiation damage as irrelevant or propagandistic in the consideration of the proposed Treaty. It is of central importance. For what the statement says, in effect, is that we do not know precisely how harmful man-made radioactivity is but we are certain that it is not good for human health or for the genetics of the human race. It is not good, in short, for men, women and children--and particularly children--in Montana, Arizona, Ohio, Washington, Nevada, Mississippi, Utah, or Missouri anymore than in London, Paris, Moscow, Peking or Tokyo. What the statement says, in effect, is that radiological technicians in hospitals do not wear heavy protective clothing and dentists do not shelter themselves for the fun of it when they take X-rays. They do so because the stuff of X-rays, as of nuclear bomb tests, is insidiously dangerous. What the statement says, in effect, is that it is highly inadvisable to put even minute quantities of strontium 90 or 89 into milk or to add other radioactive isotopes such as Iodine 131 or Cesium-137 to bread, as though they were vitamin A, B, C, or D. They are quite the reverse in their effect on human health and on the human species. The statement says, in short, handle man-made radioactivity with extreme care or, preferably, do not handle it at all.

Yet we have been compelling our own people to handle it as well as the Russian people and others, and the Russians have been compelling their people as well as ours and others to handle it. That has been the consequence of bomb tests because, beyond the radiation released in proximity to a test site, the phenomenon of fallout results in a wide distribution

throughout the world from each detonation wherever it may occur. And radioactivity is both ideologically neutral and wholly indifferent to national boundaries. When carried in the air-currents and clouds of the atmosphere it places free peoples, Communist peoples or whatever, all on this planet, in the same radioactive boat.

We will find some scientific voices saying that it is not too bad and very temporary, this thing which has already been done by nuclear bomb tests to the planetary setting in which all human life is lived. We will find some scientific opinion which takes the opposite view, that the genetic damage already done has been very substantial. And we will find many scientists who say so far it is not too bad but we had better avoid much more. That there are these differences is a reflection not so much of a disagreement on the facts but of a paucity of facts and of differing values which are put on the integrity of the individual human life. Some are more prepared than others, apparently, to sacrifice this integrity on the altar of science for what is regarded as a valid scientific or defense purpose.

In terms of statistics, our own Federal Radiation Council has made some estimates of the human costs of the radioactive by-products of nuclear bomb tests. The figures which it supplies are exclusive of the effects of the last Russian test-series of super-bombs in 1962. The Council indicates that all tests in the United States and throughout the world through 1961 could produce in this nation in this and future generations anywhere up to 15,000 cases of gross physical and mental birth defects and, possibly, up to a maximum of 2,000 leukemia cases and up to a maximum of 700 cases of bone cancer within the next 70 years. Other

adverse health effects of these tests, as, for example, those of radioactive iodine 131 to children's thyroids in the vicinity of tests sites in the mountain states of the West, are strongly suspect. The same is true of Cesium 137 which has been delivered in heavy quantities to Eskimos in Alaska as a result of Soviet tests in the Arctic.

Still other ill-effects cannot even be guessed at, as for example, those of Carbon 14 which has a radioactive life of several thousand years and may be said, therefore, to have already altered the human environment permanently.

It is all very well to note that the statistical projections suggest only a very small number of Americans as adversely affected by all tests throughout the world through 1961. But it would not be very well to tell that to the specific Americans who will suffer the consequences. Furthermore, it is clear that the Russian test series of 1962 will add to the specific totals of health damage already projected in the United States. It is clear, too, that any additional tests in the atmosphere by the Soviet Union, the United States or any other country will do the same and, in the absence of a treaty, the addition to the totals can be large or small depending upon the whim and the capacity not only of ourselves but of the Soviet Union or any other nation.

It is clear, in short, that however small the effects appear to be in the statistical computation, nuclear bomb-testing has already caused a damage to human health and, potentially, its continuance is a great danger to human health. It is so clear that it can be said in this Senate that we will not find one reputable scientific voice which will advocate the continuance of bomb tests on the grounds that they are a kind of fillip

for human health or a genetic stimulant for the improvement of the human species.

Therefore, the fundamental, if unspoken, assumption of the Treaty must be that neither this nation nor the Soviet Union seeks the dubious distinction of being the foremost contaminator of the earth's physical environment with radioactive substances. It is the assumption that the Russians are at least rational enough and human enough to be concerned with this menace to the health of their children and their grandchildren as we are with respect to ours.

Those may be erroneous assumptions. It may be, I suppose, that the Russians are so obsessed with being first that it is all the same to them whether the race has to do with the Olympic Games, the moon, economic growth, the ballet or radioactive contamination. It may be that this obsession is so strong that they are prepared to sacrifice even their progeny to it.

Even if it were so, even if the Russians were indifferent to the pollution of their own place, along with every other nation's place, in the earth's environment, then all it would signify is that this Treaty has little meaning. It would signify that the Treaty will not do much good. But, then, with the safeguards which are provided and assured, neither will it do much harm.

For what would happen, Mr. President, if we ventured on the assumption that the Russians did not wish to menace the health of their own people anymore than we and events proved us wrong? At some point in the future, then, the Russians would resume atmospheric and marine testing. But would they not be able to do that in any event in the absence of a Treaty? What is to stop them? And if they resume this dubious process

of denaturizing the physical environment of mankind what is to stop us from joining in this macabre competition once again? Not this Treaty, Mr. President. There is nothing in this Treaty which would stop us in those circumstances. And it has been made very clear in the hearings that we intend to rejoin this competition on very short notice if it is forced upon us.

No, Mr. President, if there is any safe assumption in this Treaty, it is that there is an absolute mutual interest--that of the preservation of human health--which applies to every nation on this globe. This common interest will either be pursued in good faith by all nations--especially by the United States and the Soviet Union--or all will suffer the consequences of the failure to do so. There is no escape. There is no way, neither sneak nor open, to gain an advantage in this matter of health--not for us, not for the Soviet Union, not for any nation. For the simple fact is that if there are no atmospheric tests, the geiger counters will taper their rhythms everywhere. If there are tests, the counters will click their warning to human health in every part of the world.

To be sure, Mr. President, there are other nations--France and China in particular--which, health factors notwithstanding, have already announced that they will not adhere to this Treaty. Such states will remain legally free to test nuclear weapons in any other environment. But without this Treaty such would still be the case. Even at worst, these countries cannot conceivably pose, for many years, anything remotely resembling the kind of threat to human health which is implicit in a resumption of unrestricted nuclear testing by the United States and the Soviet Union. With the Treaty effectively maintained between the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, we will have at least a period of respite which, in itself, will be of some worldwide health benefit.

And with the adherence of the great bulk of the civilized nations of the world-- over 80 nations have already signed the agreement--there will be an opportunity for a vigorous and concerted search for additional ways to make the Treaty universal in its application.

Mr. President, let me emphasize that there are no grounds for sanguine expectations that this Treaty, even if it is ratified by this nation will bring an end to the more dangerous types of nuclear testing. It is a tangible hope; that is all. But against that tangible hope there is certain dispair. In the absence of this Treaty, the process of radioactive contamination of the environment by bomb tests will continue and in all probability intensify. Past experience indicates that deploring these tests in speeches and party platforms will not end them. Introducing Senate resolutions against them will not prevent them. Passing resolutions in the U.N. General Assembly will not inhibit them. Voluntary moratoriums will not stop them. All these expediencies, short of a treaty, have been tried and they have not succeeded. The inescapable fact remains that a total anarchy in this critical matter still exists in the world. The inescapable fact is that not only this nation but every nation is still completely free at this moment to wreak damage not only on its own heritage of the earth's environment but on that of every other people. And the inescapable fact is that the fear of losing a technological military advantage or the hope of gaining one--this terrifying fear and this elusive hope--which in the past, have impelled the Russians no less than ourselves to overlook the hazards to human health in these tests will almost certainly compel us to do the same in the future. We shall be so impelled, and they shall be so impelled, unless this Treaty enters into force and is scrupulously maintained on both sides. The likelihood--I venture to

say, the certainty--is that without this Treaty, the dangers to the health of all Americans, of all human beings, from bomb-made radioactivity, will multiply. Neither an embarrassed silence nor a soft-pedaled evasion of experience and fact changes the reality one iota.

Even if the Treaty comes into force, it is obvious that this Treaty, in itself, will not halt the continuing and intense scientific and technological competition to gain a military advantage or to avoid losing one. That will go on for the present on both sides, as is very apparent from the Senate hearings and from statements emanating from Moscow. But what the Treaty does do is to put a muzzle on one aspect of that competition. What the Treaty does do is to force the competition, insofar as it is now dependent on nuclear testing on both sides, out of the atmosphere and from the seas and onto the design boards and into the factories and beneath the ground.

The Treaty may not work, Mr. President. It may be cheated or frightened or suspicioned or reserved or exceptioned into discard, quickly or in time. It may be, in the end, no more effective than the voluntary moratoriums and the resolutions or whatever of the past. And the world will go on deploring these tests even as they multiply.

I hope no Senator will vote for ratification of this Treaty on the mistaken belief that it is a guarantee that bomb tests will now cease for all times. The truth is that in voting for ratification of this Treaty, as I have already stated, we will be voting for a hope. But let me stress, Mr. President, that it is a significant, a tangible hope.

And so long as that hope, that tangible hope is present, the Senator from Montana is not going to tell the people of his state, that he voted to dash it, to kill it. He is not going to tell the people whom

he represents that President Kennedy brought this hope, first raised under President Eisenhower, to binding treaty form--this hope that there will no longer be avoidable increases in the incidence of leukemia, bone cancer, thyroid cancer, birth malformations and other radiologically induced deficiencies among Montanans and Americans and all human beings--but, for a variety of reasons, he could not support the President. The Senator from Montana is not going to say that he could not support the President because the French government or the Chinese Communist government did not like the Treaty. Nor will he say it because a prominent scientist out of a large number of prominent scientists registered the very unscientific fiat of his own opinion that the Treaty was a dreadful tragic mistake. Nor will he say it because he is convinced that in a wasteful spending competition on armaments, our taxpayers can outspend the Russians, spend them into bankruptcy without going bankrupt ourselves.

Nor will he say it because the statistical evidence showed only a few Americans would die before their time or only a few American children would be born malformed because of tests already conducted. Nor will he say it because the Treaty might also be signed by East Germany and he would much rather that the East Germans begin testing nuclear bombs than that even the remotest suggestion be given that the United States had, by getting into the same treaty, somehow recognized the existence of this East German regime.

Nor will he say it because he believes that Russians, who most certainly cannot be trusted in many things cannot be trusted even to cease

denaturizing their own environment along with ours and everyone else's on earth.

No, Mr. President, the Senator from Montana is not going to tell Montanans that he opposed this Treaty on any of these grounds. Yet all have been advanced at one time or another in the past weeks as grounds for rejecting this Treaty.

There is one ground--one ground alone--on which the Senator from Montana would be prepared to go home and tell the people who sent him to Washington, that these tests in the atmosphere and in the seas must go on despite the great potential threat of their continuance to their health and to their children's health.

He would not make light of these health risks or pass over them but he would ask his constituents to accept them in all their grim portent because he was persuaded that this Treaty would expose the nation, to a greater extent than we now are, to a military attack which would destroy both the meaning and much of the substance of the life which we have built.

He would not ask them to accept the health risks of indiscriminate and uncontrolled nuclear testing if all he had was a personal surmise that the risks of military attack would increase, if all he had were vague personal doubts and hesitancies in the face of a new course. To ask them to accept the health risks he would have to find in the total record, specifics for concluding that the risks of military attack would be significantly increased by our adherence to this Treaty. He would have to find, in specifics, affirmative answers to these questions:

1. Is there some nation, other than the Soviet Union--Communist China, for example--which, by not adhering to this Treaty, is likely to develop a nuclear technology which will approximate ours in the next decade,

another nation which could close the nuclear gap solely because it tested and we did not? The answer is no.

2. If the Soviet Union, then, is the one nation which poses a nuclear threat to the United States in the next decade or more, has that nation already achieved a substantial advantage, on balance, over the United States in the military technology derived from nuclear physics--the kind of advantage which we might neutralize by a continuance of above-ground tests on our side even though they also continued to improve their techniques through such testing on their side? The answer, insofar as it is possible to answer the question, on the basis of fact, knowledge and the overwhelming judgment of the most highly skilled and qualified witnesses in the nation is no.

3. Is there any reason to assume that our advances in nuclear science and its application to military technology will be hampered to a greater degree than that of the Soviet Union, in the complete absence of atmospheric and marine tests on both sides? The answer is no.

4. By the terms of this Treaty, will the Soviet Union be legally authorized to do anything which we are not also authorized to do? The answer is no.

5. By the terms of this Treaty are we legally forbidden to do anything which the Soviet Union is not legally forbidden to do? The answer is no.

6. Is there any other than the most remote possibility that the Soviet Union could engage in prohibited but significant tests without detection? The answer is no.

7. If the Soviet Union were to engage in a clandestine test and if it were identified or if we had very valid reason to believe that such a test had occurred even if not identified, would we ourselves still be bound to forego a resumption in testing above ground? The answer is no.

8. Is there a significant possibility that a single Soviet test suddenly sprung upon us could so alter the balance of military forces between the two nations as to increase the risk of military attack upon us. The answer is no.

In short, the answer to every specific doubt which involves the possibility of the Soviet Union or any nation gaining some unique or significant military advantage as against ourselves in this Treaty is not yes but no. And because it is no, I cannot in good conscience ask any citizen of Montana to accept the heightened risks to the health of their families which will be inevitable in the absence of the ratification of this Treaty by the United States.

If there are not specific grounds of unique disadvantage to the military defense of the nation for rejecting this Treaty, what other grounds can there be? One detects in the few articulate opponents of this Treaty, a consistent theme which suggests a basis for the remaining doubts and hesitancies. It is, apparantly, the belief that our scientific-military complex is so superior to all others that if not subjected to any limitation as to nuclear testing, it will produce an amazing advance in military-nuclear technology. The complex, it is suggested, will achieve some incredible breakthrough so as to widen, once and for all, the gap as between ourselves and the Soviet Union. That the Soviet Union, of course, in the absence of a testing limitation, will also be free to seek a similar breakthrough

is either overlooked or regarded of little consequence. That there are dangers to health in the continuing process of uncontrolled testing by both sides, of course, is either overlooked or regarded as of little consequence.

Mr. President, I have the highest respect for our nuclear physics, our industrial technology, our military leadership and our capacity to merge them into a powerful complex for the purpose of the nation's defense. This complex is second to none in the world. But admiration and respect for these capacities do not and must never compel the elected officials of this nation to accept the dictum of this complex as to what is best for the people of the United States.

The fact is that this Treaty will introduce no curbs upon the creativity and dynamism of the complex which are not also placed equally upon such complexes in the Soviet Union and elsewhere in the world. That men of scientific genius or highly developed technological specialization may find such curbs irksome or burdensome is understandable. But there is too much at stake here, for the nation and for the world, for the Senate to be persuaded by individual considerations of that kind.

Indeed, reason and experience must lead us to question most seriously the course of policy which flows from such considerations. It is the course which assumes that if we will only continue to debar any restraints on testing, if we will only continue to throw considerations of public health to the winds, our scientists and our technicians will create that decisive nuclear gap, that ultimate military gap, which will insure the nation's security.

Have we not in reality followed precisely such a course since the first atomic bombs in the New Mexico flats and over Hiroshima and Nagasaki? What restraints, indeed, what reins have been placed on the full exploration of this immense power of nuclear destruction in all these years? Not those of money, to be sure. Not those of a ban on testing, to be sure. Through all these years since World War II there has been no treaty to bar nuclear tests of any kind. We have tested again and again. The Russians have done the same.

And what has happened, Mr. President? We began in 1945 with the atomic bomb, with what we believed was the decisive gap, the ultimate gap. By 1949, four years later, the Russians began to close that gap with their first atomic test. In 1952, we opened what we believed was the decisive gap, the ultimate gap, with the first explosion of the immensely more powerful hydrogen bomb. And by 1953, nine months later, that gap too began to close in a Soviet test of a similar type of weapon.

So we must ask ourselves, Mr. President, what has happened in all these years of unrestricted testing? Has the gap widened with the free rein which has been allowed to the scientific-industrial-military complex? Have we gained the absolute advantage, the ultimate advantage which will guarantee the nation's security? The truth is that the gap has not widened. On the contrary, it has narrowed almost to the vanishing point. It has narrowed both in terms of the basic knowledge of the sciences involved and in terms of the application of that knowledge in military technology.

Once no nation, except ourselves, could have inflicted on any other, tens of millions of nuclear deaths in a matter of hours. Now, we ourselves, no less than others, are subject to a catastrophe of this magnitude.

In short, the nation has not been made more secure in any real sense by this indiscriminate and unchecked pursuit of security by nuclear development through almost two decades for the simple reason that others were also engaged in the same indiscriminate and unchecked pursuit. This furious and frantic race for superiority in the capacity to inflict nuclear devastation in mass or in caliperic refinement in the interests of national security in the end has provided security to no nation. It has provided only the assurance that the prospect of immediate and massive destruction to others will be at least as great as that prospect is to ourselves. That is vitally important insurance in the kind of world in which we live but let us not delude ourselves as to the nature of the coverage. We have provided not security for the nation but only insurance that if our civilization is put to the nuclear torch by any hand, others will be consumed in the same stupendous blaze.

To cling to the belief that the continuance of indiscriminate testing is the margin which provides for the security of this nation is to fly in the face of the reality of experience. It is not a scientific view. It is not even an understandable pride and faith in our own great scientific, technological and military capacities. It is a mystic and egocentric belief which borders--and I choose the words carefully--on a most dangerous and tragic obsession.

Mr. President, this Treaty, in itself, is no answer to that obsession. This Treaty is but a slender strand of hope drawn painfully from the web of conflicting interests, hideous fears and fatuous and immature arrogances out of which are spun the relations of nations in our times. It is an evidence, slight and uncertain, but an evidence that there exists that capacity of courage and that will to life, which may yet bring to bear on this stifling entanglement, the quiet and simple power of human reason.

Do not, Mr. President, look for miracles from this Treaty. There are none. This nation, the Soviet Union and the world are destined to live for a long time with feet dangling over the grave that beckons to the human civilization which is our common heritage. Against that immense void of darkness, this Treaty is a feeble candle. It is a flicker of light where there has been no light.

The Senator from Montana will vote for this light and he will hope for its strengthening by subsequent acts of reason on all sides. He will vote for ratification of this Treaty because it is, on clear balance, in the interests of the people of his state and the United States. He will vote for it because it is a testament to the universal vitality of reason. He will vote for it because it is an affirmation of human life itself.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA)

Given at

Rocky Mountain College, Billings, Montana

Thursday, October 24, 1963

The United Nations has been in existence as an organization for 18 years. Some will look back over the years and re-discover that there is much in its record to applaud. Others will do the same and convince themselves that the organization has done little of value and, indeed, has become a kind of menace to this nation.

But there are countless Americans in this state and in the nation who seek neither to prove that the United Nations is all good or all bad. The only concern which they have is that the U.N. make a contribution to peace and to international decency. These Americans have not closed their eyes to the fact that this nation--all nations--walk a tightrope stretched across the bottomless pit of a catastrophic nuclear war. These Americans recognize that the tightrope sways violently with every wind of conflict--whether it blows in Asia, in Africa, in the Middle East or elsewhere.

These Americans will not dismiss as useless or worse, any rational attempt to temper these winds of conflicts. They will not consign to the waste-heap of history an organization which has helped to do that in the deserts of the Middle East, and in the high mountains of Kashmir between India and Pakistan. These Americans will not make light of the sacrifice of the life of Dag Hammarskjold, a great and decent human being who raised the barrier of the U.N. against the hurricanes of hate in the Congo.

Nor will these Americans dismiss as useless or dangerous to this nation the work which the United Nations has done in marshalling an international effort to feed and clothe and otherwise help children in need wherever they may be, the work to eradicate the scourge of diseases such as malaria in forgotten corners of the world, to teach the unenlightened how to farm better and to develop community skills and habits which may lead them out of the morass of a crushing poverty and a superstitious ignorance.

These American will not condemn an organization whose purpose is to build bridges of peace and understanding among nations where too few exist, whose purpose is to promote a less cruel and more decent life for men, women and children throughout the world.

We may deplore the inadequacies of the U.N. We may criticize what are sometimes meddlesome tendencies on the part of immature member-governments. We may denounce the irresponsibility which leads some nations to vote grandiose United Nations action in some situation or other and then leave by the nearest exit when the price of the action is announced in the Assembly. We may be dismayed by the moral preachments of certain nations which do not accord with their national practices.

It is proper that we deplore, criticize, and denounce when these expressions are required. Spades are spades and should be so called, in the U. N. or anywhere else. But in calling them--and I have done my share as a United States delegate on two occasions to the U. N. General Assembly and in the Congress--I do not believe our purpose ought to be to destroy but rather to improve. Mature Americans can recognize the significant contribution of the organization to the world, and to this nation as a part of it, while at the same time we recognize that the contribution is far from enough.

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Every day, so far as most of us are concerned, is United States Day. Each of us in our own way might very well by our actions and words, 365 days a year, re-dedicate ourselves to the preservation and enhancement of all that this nation means to us and all that it stands for in the history of mankind. And, may I say that I can see nothing inconsistent with the respect and love which we have for our country in giving recognition and careful attention once a year to a principal institution through which this nation and all nations, if they have the will as well as the words, may find the difficult way to a decent understanding and mutual respect among the world's peoples and to a durable peace.

Cong. Record, p. 19511-13
Oct. 30, 1963

COMPROMISE IN A DEMOCRACY

Speech Given by Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Montana) before the Convention of the Montana Education Association

Missoula, Montana, October 25, 1963

It is with great personal pleasure that I meet with you today. I have enjoyed a long affinity with the MEA, as a teacher in fact and in retrospect over the years.

In undertaking this speech, I am reminded of one given by a Pennsylvania Congressman several years ago. The Congressman was congratulating himself for giving what he considered a rather good talk when a lady approached him. She was most enthusiastic and exclaimed to the Congressman: "Your speech was simply superfluous, simply superfluous!" Assuming she was pulling his leg, he replied in the same vein, "Thank you. I'm thinking of having that speech published posthumously." Again she was full of enthusiasm, and said, "Yes, yes, the sooner the better!" There is no doubt that a similar comment on my speech today would be greeted with fervent approval in some political circles in Montana. But as an educator among educators I anticipate a somewhat more sympathetic treatment here regardless of your political views.

When I was asked to speak, today, several topics were suggested. The one entitled "Compromise in a Democracy" caught my attention at once. That is not strange, since the word "compromise" is very frequently associated with the word "politics."

An overworked, but nevertheless accurate phrase states that politics is the art of compromise, or "the art of things possible" as Count Cavour put it a century ago. Unfortunately, there are those who view both "compromise" and "politics" as equally noxious terms. But if that view had predominated in our history, this nation would have not known an orderly evolution. Indeed, without the constant exercise of compromise, a popularly responsive and responsible government such as we know could not exist.

We have learned, through experience, that compromise is an essential ingredient of a government by consent. The history of our own State is a good example. The tradition of our early years, as you well know, is accented with violence. Many of our pioneers were veterans of the Civil War and our early history reflects some of the vindictive aftermath of that conflict. Vigilante law and the quick draw, not compromise and due process, were an early and accepted way of dealing with differences. In honesty, however, I suspect that the actual casualties which resulted from this approach in all the early years of the State's settlement do not equal the current output of death by violence in a week of T/V westerns.

I have always been intrigued by a story of what took place in in the Madison ~~Montana~~ in the winter of 1863-64. Several of Henry Plummer's gang of road agents, it is recorded, were on the loose. ~~descended upon the town~~. Everyone believed

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they were intent upon rifling a safe which held $65,000. Convinced not by their actions--they were just loafing at the community store--but by their reputation, a posse of 21 citizens from Alder Gulch ~~rode into~~ Nevada, rounded up Plummer's gang, held a brief trial in the store, and sentenced all of them to be hung. With the expedition which characterized such proceedings, the company adjourned to a nearby barn. The rope was thrown over a beam, and George Shears, one of Plummer's men, was asked to walk up a ladder into the hay to save the trouble of preparing a drop for him. "Gentlemen," Shears said, "I am not used to this business. Shall I jump off or slide off?" He was told to jump--and so he died.

As late as April, 1883, the Territorial Governor of our State telegraphed the postal authorities at Washington:

"Vigilantes at Greenhorn, Montana, have removed postmaster by hanging. . .Office. . .now vacant."

We have come some distance since those early days. Office-holders, today, are no longer removed by hanging but rather by the more refined--and, presumably, less painful--process of the ballot. I, personally and understandably regard this as a great achievement.

One of the keys to this transition has been the general recognition that an orderly society is inconceivable in the absence of the will to compromise. To say this is not to defend those instances in which compromise represents an abuse of public power and a violation of

public trust. But I do say that the view which tends to hold compromise in contempt is a most unfortunate one. And it does not matter whether this view is applied in local setting, in state or national politics or, indeed, to international problems. For it is but one step from the disdain of compromise to the application of the opprobrium of appeasement or "sell-out" to all who practice this essential art of political--indeed of all--human relations. And to cast aspersions upon the efforts to solve by compromise, problems which defy the simple solution is to invite chaos. And with it, would only come a return to the law of the vigilante and the quick draw--this, in a world in which one quick draw in the final analysis may be the last.

If there is anything which I have learned in more than two decades in Congress, it is that issues which have only two sides--and which can be disposed of largely on the basis of all right or all wrong--are for the most part either unimportant, old and settled matters or rarely, new questions which, not infrequently, have tragic implications. The Declaration of War against Japan, for example, was passed in less than a day and with only one dissenting vote in both Houses of Congress. It was a clear-cut issue but it was also a tragic issue.

In Congress, today, most defense measures are also passed by nearly unanimous vote. The necessity for them is clear-cut and long established and remains essentially unchanged in the absence of significant change in the world situation. In every Congress, of course, we also pass

many minor bills unanimously. But for the most part, they involve the relief of a single citizen who in some way or other has suffered some obvious injury at the hands of the government or other matters of very limited implication.

But with respect to significant new issues, quick and unanimous agreement is unusual. There are just too many millions of persons in this country, too many groups and sub-groups, whose interests are affected by the passage of legislation. Here are some of the more obvious divisions within our society.

** There are ten distinct geographic divisions and countless subdivisions in the United States, each with its own peculiar problems and interests.

** The last census showed 125 million people living in urban areas and 54 million in rural areas. The former stress that the government's resources and energies should be directed toward cleaning up slums, improving mass transportation systems and a thousand other worthwhile goals. The latter call for greater investment in conservation, more emphasis on strengthening the agricultural and livestock industries and so forth.

** Over 20 million Negroes and numerous whites of almost every religious demonination ask for equality of treatment for all Americans in all walks of life and demand that it be given today. Other millions resist this effort and urge, in effect, there be a slow-down in the process of applying with greater equity the promise of the Constitution to all citizens.

** There are more than 18 million persons over 65 years of age, many of whom are living out their final years in poverty and fear of financially catastrophic sickness. They ask that the rest of the nation consider their past contributions, if not the future to which we are all headed, by providing a self-respecting and adequate system of insurance against the major financial hazards. Yet there are some--and I would hope not too many Americans--who would begrudge any such system to older citizens especially if it is under the general control of the Federal government. But how otherwise it might be adequately provided is not made clear.

** On the other end of the age spectrum, there are some 70 million persons under the age of 20. Their needs, if we are to look to a stable national future, include adequate access to higher education, commensurate with ability. They include in many parts of the nation sufficient classrooms and teachers at all levels of education. And they include action to open up jobs, to end ill-advised or avoidable school drop-outs, and to develop a sound, well-rounded national approach to the mounting delinquency problems of our young people. And no one knows better than educators that the term juvenile delinquency covers a complex multitude of factors which will not be dispelled simply because we have assigned them this glib name and then wrung our hands and deplored the name.

There is, too, as still another aspect of our national diversity, the endless conflict of industrial interests as among themselves and with agricultural interests. Poultry raisers in Georgia and beef producers in Montana and their Congressmen and Senators, including me, watch with growing concern the rising imports of their products into the United States. Detroit workers who owe their living in part to the export of automotive parts fear that tariffs which we impose will bring retaliation against them.

The government sustains prices for raw cotton production in order to help one set of farmers. The cotton is disposed of at bargain terms abroad in order to keep the stockpiles from mounting too high. This bargain-term cotton is manufactured into various textiles abroad and when some of these are exported to the United States, we face the complaints of our own textile producers in New England, or, indeed, in the same states where the cotton is grown. And so it goes and we do the best we can to deal with these inconsistencies while at the same time, through compromise, we seek to strike some measure of equity for all parts of the land and for all groups in the economy.

** In the political arena, the monopoly by the Republicans and Democrats leads some to suppose that there are only two well-defined parties in the nation. But there are other political and quasi political bodies competing for public acceptance and there are repeated divisions

and alinements within each party. It is significant, for example, that in the vote in the Senate on ratification of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 25 Republicans joined 55 Democrats in support of the Treaty while only 8 Republicans joined 11 Democrats in opposition.

Anyone who has had the opportunity to travel the length and breadth of this great land cannot but be amazed by the tremendous vitality in its diversity. This quality contributes much to our strength and our greatness. At the same time it is a major source of the need for compromise. All of the diverse interests must somehow be contained within a broader concept of national interest. For, in the last analysis there is no future for agriculture in this nation unless there is also a future for industry and the reverse is true. There is no future for protestants unless there is also a future for Catholics, Jews and others and the reverse is true. There is no future for the Negro if there is not also a future for the White and the reverse is true. There is no future for Montana if there is not also a future for the other States and the reverse is true. In short, the diversities of interest must in some way find, through compromise and mutual restraint, a common meeting place in the national interest and a common hope in the nation's future. Unless they do so the immense strength and vitality of t he whole may be exhausted in the bitter schisms of the parts.

This nation has grown great and is great, in short, precisely because we have learned the art of compromise. It has given us a powerful unity which undergirds our position as a nation in the world and provides stable progress at home. Throughout our history, only the Civil War yields an example of the overwhelming and devastating rejection of the process of compromise. That one exception came when the passion of various groups for their own point of view grew so overweening as to foreclose rational reconciliation among them. And even today, we are haunted by this failure of a century ago. Problems which might otherwise have long since been resolved are still with us. And we have still a difficult way to go before the racial and sectional fears and suspicions and misunderstandings--the grim heritage of that one great failure--are finally laid to rest, as one day they will be.

We would do well to consider some of the factors which complicate the art of mutual accommodation and make more difficult the tasks of this nation. There are two which stand out and which have a special urgency for us today. I have touched upon one of these already. It has to do with the apparent compulsion of some to insist that the simple solution can be applied to every problem--no matter how complex it may be. The other is the tendency of many Americans to question the motives or loyalty of those with whom they disagree. Both tendencies have long existed in

mankind. But the complex life of the 20th Century has sharpened them--and at a time and under conditions when the nation can least afford them.

The shrinking of distance, the greater mobility and forced association of peoples who a short time ago would never have come into contact with one another, the increased urbanization, the growing population and the increasing impersonalism of our economic organization have all contributed to an atmosphere of greater anxiety and insecurity. And overall, hangs the ever-present specter of devastating nuclear conflict, although just a few weeks ago, we witnessed a glimmer of hope in this connection with the signing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

It is not surprising, then, that there is a nostalgic desire on the part of many to cling to the belief that a return to simpler days, days of the relative isolation of individuals, communities and states is a choice still open to us as a nation. I can understand this desire. Indeed, there are days when I share it. But the front page of any morning's newspaper is enough to dispell it. The added pressures within the nation and the awesome dangers from without make it more imperative than ever that we seek solutions which take full cognizance of the complexities of modern life in this nation and in the world. If we are to succeed in finding solutions we must draw into a common pool such wisdom and sensitivity as may be available in all parts of the nation, in all political parties.

We cannot read any able citizen out of the community simply because we do not happen to agree with him politically. We cannot arbitrarily decide as some have done that an American as distinguished in his service to the nation as former President Eisenhower or his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, were not only useless but even worse--virtual enemies of America. If these men were not worthy of bearing the name Americans then I am not and no person in this room is worthy of it. Who, then, is worthy?

The truth is that no single individual, no single group, no single political party has a monopoly on virtue or patriotism. None can lay claim to sole possession of all that is necessary to make our nation work. None has all the answers. But all are Americans and each in his own way has a contribution to make which can only be made if we have a measure of mutual respect and mutual restraint and accommodation.

The democratic process--the practice of compromise--does not necessarily provide perfect answers. But it has supplied and will continue to supply suitable answers and the only answers suitable to a free people.

It does not matter whether the place where these answers are sought happens to be the Congress of the United States or the city council of Missoula--or for that matter, the PTA, or the MEA. The problems facing Congress may be more complex. The decisions made by it

may affect far more people. But in the final analysis in the House of Representatives it is almost 500 men and women and in the Senate, it is 100 men and women meeting in a face-to-face situation trying to do the best that they can to serve the interests of the States and people whom they represent. There is nothing to keep Senators from pulling the government apart in this process, nothing that is, except self-discipline, mutual respect, tolerance for the views of others and a willingness to compromise. The system is far from perfect and the answers which it produces are not necessarily always the best. Nevertheless, the institution is bound together by the desire to safeguard and advance particular interests in the context of the total national good. It works largely because individual Senators are prepared not to press their concept of what is 100 per cent perfect 100 per cent of the time.

I have emphasized the legislative branch of the government because it is most familiar to me. But these observations apply to a considerable degree to the Executive Branch of the government. Too often we forget that the President of the United States is only a human being faced with a superhuman task. Every time he makes a significant decision, a thousand and one pressures are directed upon him from all parts of the nation as well as from abroad. And he, too, must think in terms of the accommodation of these pressures to the end that the nation stays on an even keel and moves with an orderly and unified progress. The President, too, does the best he can on the basis of patriotic dedication to the nation and that applies, may I say on the basis of my personal observations for two decades, no less to President Eisenhower than it does to President Kennedy and to the Presidents who preceded them.

In these remarks, I have tried to emphasize that the words "compromise" and "politics" are not in themselves unsavory terms, but rather they are the staff of freedom. Successful compromise is as necessary as the air we breathe. This is true for all aspects of government--from the smallest community in Montana to the Congress and Presidency of the United States.

I have every confidence that we will continue to exercise the good will towards one another and the moderation which have done so much to make this nation great. And while the T/V westerns will continue to awaken a warm and an understandable nostalgia for the simpler days of the frontier--especially since we did not have to bear their hardships in the comfort of our living-rooms--I have every confidence that Americans also recognize that the real frontiers of the modern world now lie on the fringes of outer space. We will think and act as we must in order to live and prosper in this changed setting even as the frontiersmen thought and acted in consonance with the realities which they encountered and so, lived and prospered.

As educators, I can think of no way in which you might better prepare the youth of the state for a responsible, useful and satisfying life than to help them to understand what the nation and world today are really like and to emphasize to them the place of compromise, mutual accommodation and tolerance in making both run in freedom.

Cong. Record, pp. 21754-63

November 27, 1963

STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA)

Mr. President:

Minutes before the tragedy last Friday, I asked the Senate for unanimous consent that I might be recognized on the following Monday at the conclusion of the morning hour for the purpose of making a statement o n the Senate and its leadership. The remarks which I had already prepared at that time were intended to set forth a few facts on the Congress, in order to set straight some of the generalizations and the illusions about the Senate which had been coming from a variety of informed quarters. It was a statement of what has been achieved, not by any genius of the Leadership or by some Senate establishment but by the 100 Members of this body working in cooperation and in mutual respect. The statement is, I repeat the record of 100 Senators. We all share in the responsibility for its achievements as well as for its shortcomings. There have been both achievements and shortcomings and both are recorded in the statement, I hope, in useful perspective and on the basis of fact. I have recorded it on the basis of what is tangible in the legislative record not on the basis of what the Senate looks like at 8:00 at night or whether the Members are driven or herded or function at their own collective pace and of their own will. After awhile, what the Senate appears to have been in any given period will be noted, if at all, only by the scholars. What the Senate does in a legislative sense in any given period will be felt for a long, long time by all the people of the nation. We are not here as actors and actresses to be applauded. We are here as Senators to do the business of the government. It is not we but it is that alone, in the end, which counts to the nation.

So, Mr. President, the remarks which I had intended to deliver on Monday last in the nature of an interim report on the Senate and its leadership, now becomes because of this overwhelming tragedy, a final report on the Senate and its leadership during the Presidency of John Fitzgerald Kennedy and an indication of what remains to be done under the Administration of President Johnson.

In the light of what has happened, I have no heart to read this report to the Senate. I ask unanimous consent, therefore, that the statement, "The Senate and Its Leadership" unchanged from what it was as prepared for delivery in the Senate on Monday, November 25, 1963 be printed as though read at this point in the Record.

Completed November 22, 1963. For Release Noon, November 25, 1963.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA)

The Senate and Its Leadership

Mr. President:

Some days ago blunt words were said on the floor of the Senate. They dealt in critical fashion with the state of this institution. They dealt in critical fashion with the quality of the Majority Leadership and the Minority opposition. In doing so, a far more important matter than criticism or praise of the leadership was involved. It is a matter which goes to the fundamental nature of the Senate.

In this light, we have reason to be grateful because if what was stated was being said in the cloakrooms, then it should have been said on the floor. If, as was indicated, the functioning of the Senate itself is in question, the place to air that matter is on the floor of the Senate. We need no cloakroom commandos, operating behind the swinging doors of the two rooms at the rear, to spread the tidings. We need no whispered word passed from one to another and on to the press.

We are here to do the public's business. On the floor of the Senate, the public's business is conducted in full sight and hearing of the public. And it is here, not in the cloakrooms, that the Senator from Montana, the Majority Leader, if you wish, will address himself to the question of the present state of the Senate and its leadership. The Senator from Montana has nothing to conceal. He has nothing which is best whispered in the cloakrooms. What he has to say on this score will be said here. It will be said to all Senators and to all the members of the press who sit above us in more ways than one.

How, Mr. President, do you measure the performance of this Congress--any Congress? How do you measure the performance of a Senate of 100 independent men and women--any Senate? The question rarely arises at least until an election approaches. And, then, our concern may well be with our own individual performance and not necessarily with that of the Senate as a whole.

Yet that performance--the performance of the Senate as a whole--has been judged on the floor. Several Senators, at least, judged it and found it seriously wanting. And with the hue and cry thus raised, they found echoes outside the Senate. I do not criticize Senators for making the judgment, for raising the alarm. Even less do I criticize the press for spreading it. Senators were within their rights. And the press was not only within its rights but was performing a segment of its public duty which is to report what transpires here.

I, too, am within my rights, Mr. President, and I believe I am performing a duty of the leadership when I ask again: How do you judge the performance of this Congress--any Congress? Of this Senate--any Senate? Do you mix a concoction and drink it? And if you feel a sense of well-being thereafter decide it is not so bad a Congress after all? But if you feel somewhat ill or depressed then that, indeed, is proof unequivocal that the Congress is a bad Congress and the Senate is a bad Senate. Or do you shake your head back and forth negatively before a favored columnist when discussing the performance of this Senate? And if he, in turn, nods up and down, then that is proof that the performance is bad?

With all due respect, Mr. President, I searched the remarks of the Senators who have raised the questions. I searched them carefully for I do not make light of the criticism of any Member of this body. I searched them carefully for any insight as to how we might judge accurately the performance of this Senate, in order that we might try to improve it.

There is reference, to be sure, to time-wasting, to laziness, to absenteeism, to standing still and so forth. But who are the time-wasters in the Senate, Mr. President? Who is lazy? Who is an absentee? Each Member can make his own judgment of his individual performance. I make no apologies for mine. Nor will I sit in judgment on any other Member. On that score, each of us will answer to his own conscience, if not to his constituents.

But, Mr. President, insofar as the performance of the Senate as a whole is concerned, with all due respect, these comments on time-wasting have little relevance. Indeed, the Congress can, as it has--as it did in declaring World War II in less than a day--pass legislation which has the profoundest meaning for the entire nation. And by contrast, the Senate floor can look very busy day in and day out, month in and month out, while the Senate is, indeed, dawdling. At one time in the recollection of many of us, we debated a civil rights measure twenty-four hours a day for many days on end. We debated it shaven and unshaven. We debated it without ties, with hair awry and even in bedroom slippers. In the end, we wound up with compromise legislation. And it was not the fresh and well-rested opponents of the civil rights measure who were compelled to the compromise. It was, rather, the exhausted, sleep-starved quorum-confounded proponents who were only too happy to take it.

No, Mr. President, if we would estimate the performance of this Congress or any other, this Senate or any other, we will have to find a more reliable yardstick than whether, on the floor, we act as time-wasters or moonlighters. As every Member of the Senate and press knows, even if the public generally does not, the Senate is neither more nor less effective because the Senate is in session from 9:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m. or to 9:00 a.m. the next day. In fact, such hours would most certainly make it less effective in present circumstances.

Nor does the length of the session indicate a greater or lesser effectiveness. We live in a twelve-months nation. It may well be that the times are pushing us in the direction of a twelve-months Congress. In short, we cannot measure a Congress or a Senate by the standards of the stretch-out or of the speed-up. It will be of no avail to install a time-clock at the entrance to the Chamber for Senators to punch when they enter or leave the floor.

There has been a great deal said on this floor about feather-bedding in certain industries. But if we want to see a featherbedding to end all featherbedding, we will have the Senate sit here day in and day out from dawn until dawn, whether or not the calendar calls for it, in order to impress the boss--the American people--with our industriousness. We may not shuffle papers as bureaucrats are assumed to do when engaged in this art. What we are likely to shuffle is words--words to the President on how to execute the foreign policy or administer the domestic affairs of the nation. And when these words pall, we undoubtedly will

turn to the Court to give that institution the benefit of our advice on its responsibilities. And if we run out of judicial wisdom we can always turn to advising the governors of the states or the mayors of the cities or the heads of other nations on how to manage their concerns.

Let me make it clear that Senators individually have every right to comment on whatever they wish and to do so on the floor of the Senate. Highly significant initiatives on all manner of public affairs have had their genesis in the remarks of individual Senators on the floor. But there is one clear-cut, day-in-and-day-out responsibility of the Senate as a whole. Beyond all others, it is the Constitutional responsibility to be here and to consider and to act in concert with the House on the legislative needs of the nation. And the effectiveness with which that responsibility is discharged cannot be measured by any reference to the clocks on the walls of the Chamber.

Nor can it be measured, really, by the output of legislation. For those who are computer-minded, however, the record shows that 12,656 bills and resolutions were introduced in the 79th Congress (1945-1946). And in the 87th Congress (1961-1962) 20,316 bills and resolutions were introduced, an increase of 60%. And the records show further that in the 79th Congress 2,117 bills and resolutions were passed and in the 87th 2,217 were passed.

But what do these figures tell us, Mr. President? Do they tell us that the Congress has been doing poorly because in the face of an 8,000 increase in the biannual imput of bills and resolutions the output of laws fifteen years later had increased by only a hundred? They tell us nothing of the kind.

If these figures tell us anything, they tell us that the pressures on Congress have intensified greatly. They suggest, further, that Congress may be resistent to these pressures. But whether Congress resists rightly or wrongly, to the benefit or detriment of the nation, these figures tell us nothing at all.

There is a refinement in the statistical approach. It may have more meaning than the gross figures in measuring the effectiveness of a Democratic Administration. I refer to the approach which is commonly used these days of totaling the Presidential or Executive Branch requests for significant legislation and weighing against that total the number of Congressional responses in the form of law.

On this basis, if the Congress enacts a small percentage of the Executive Branch requests it is presumed, somewhat glibly and impertinently, to be an ineffective Congress. But if the percentage is high, it follows that it is classifiable as an effective Congress. I am not so sure that I would agree and I am certain that the distinguished Minority Leader and his party would not agree that that is a valid test. The opposition might measure in precisely the opposite fashion. The opposition might, indeed, find a Democratic Congress which enacted little if any of a Democratic Administration's legislation, a paragon among Congresses. And yet I know that the distinguished Minority Leader does not reason in that fashion for he has acted time and again not to kill Administration measures but to help to pass them when he was persuaded that the interests of the nation so required.

In any event, the statistics on this score are not calculated to give aid and comfort to those who are in a hurry to mark off this Congress as a failure at the midway. For here, Mr. President, are the facts:

As of November 15, the Executive had submitted 125 legislative recommendations to the 88th Congress, in the form of messages, letters and communications. In addition, fifteen appropriations bills have come down. Thus, the total is 140. But for three of these measures, the Executive Branch has yet to suggest draft legislation. The working total of Executive requests, therefore, is 137.

Now, of these measures, 45 have been enacted into law. Two have had conference reports filed and will shortly be enacted. In conference at the present time are six more. And already passed in the Senate and awaiting House action are 26 additional Executive measures. In sum, Mr. President, 79 of the requested 137 Executive measures, or 58% of the program, has, in effect, cleared the Senate. As a Democratic Senator who needs to make no apology to any Member on this side of the aisle for his voting record in support of the President, I, nevertheless, find nothing to brag about in these figures. But neither do I find any grounds for apology as Majority Leader. I ask any Member to search the Record and find in the postwar years, a basis for deprecating the work of the 88th Congress on a statistical basis of this kind. The 88th Congress has yet to run its course but about 60% at the midway is not in any sense an inadequate statistical response to the President's program. And I would point out that the figure of laws enacted pursuant to the President's program in the 87th Congress was 68%. And I ask the Senate to search the Record and find a basis for deprecating the work of that Congress on a statistical analysis of this kind.

In short, I see no basis for apology on statistical grounds either for this Congress to date or for the last. But at the same time, I do not take umbrage in statistics. I do not think that statistics, however refined, tell much of the story of whether or not a particular Congress or Senate is effective or ineffective.

But there is still another test which persuades me that the previous Congress under this Administration was and--before it is done in 1964--this Congress will be more than adequate. This test, admittedly, is a subjective one. Yet it may provide a more accurate insight than statistics into what really matters most in any Congress. I refer to the test of history. I refer to the capacity of a Congress--any Congress--to produce what might be called significant legislation of adjustment, legislation which is in consonance with the forces of change which are at work in the nation and in the world of its time. I refer to the capacity of a Congress to do its part, to do what it must, to keep the nation attuned to ever-changing national and international realities. I refer to the ability of a Congress to come to grips with those few specific critical issues which confront it and to act constructively on them.

And before it becomes fashionable to hold up to ridicule this Congress and the last as well, it seems to me appropriate to take a look at the historic record in the light of this criterion. It seems to me sensible to isolate from the appearnce of things, from the hundreds of things which any Congress does, those few specific measures which past Congresses have enacted, measures which without too much stretch of the

imagination may be regarded as significant legislation of adjustment--the legislation which reveals the vitality of a Congress in meeting the needs of the nation in its time.

The lists which I am about to set forth are arbitrary, to be sure, but any oversights are inadvertent. I welcome any additions to them from other Members who may feel that I have slighted the achievements of any past Congress.

Let me go back, Mr. President, to the 80th Congress, to the first full Congress after the war. What significant legislation do we find in those years 1947 and 1948? This, Mr. President, is the list:

1. The Congress adopted the Marshall Plan and other urgent foreign aid programs.

2. It legislated the unification of the Armed Forces.

3. It ratified the peace treaties with Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania.

4. It ratified the Inter-American Treaty.

5. It added the peril-point concept to reciprocal trade.

6. It adopted a peace-time selective service act.

7. It passed the Taft-Hartley Act.

That is the record of that Congress, of the significant legislation of the 80th Congress, of a Republican Congress in a Democratic Administration. It is not an unimpressive record, Mr. President, especially for a so-called "do-nothing Congress."

What of the 81st, of the years 1949-1950, Mr President, of a Democratic Congress in a Democratic Administration? This is the list:

1. It expanded Social Security.

2. It authorized federal aid for the construction of housing for middle income families.

3. It set up the National Science Foundation.

4. It enacted federal aid to education for impacted areas.

5. It authorized aid to Yugoslavia.

6. It raised taxes.

7. It passed the Internal Security Act

8. It removed the peril point concept from reciprocal trade.

9. It continued substantial foreign aid programs.

10. The Senate made cloture more difficult to invoke.

On the basis of this list can we say with certainty that it was better than the 80th Congress--of the so-called "do-nothing Congress"--but the Congress which, nevertheless, enacted the Marshall Plan?

Here is the list of the legislation of adjustment for the 82nd Congress; for the years 1951-1952:

1. It appropriated $179.2 billion, more money than any peace-time Congress in history.

2. It raised taxes to the highest peace-time level.

3. It passed the first universal military training bill in history

4 It approved the stationing of troops in Europe.

5. It increased certain Social Security payments.

6. It passed a G I bill for Korean veterans.

7. It restored the peril point concept to reciprocal trade.

8 It continued substantial foreign aid programs

And so, Mr. President, we come to the first Eisenhower Congress, the 83rd, for the years 1953 and 1954. Here is the list for these two years:

1. Its first order of significant business was to confirm the titles of the states--as against the federal government--to submerged tidelands, to the repository of a substantial share of the nation's resources in petroleum.

2. It acquiesced in reorganization plans for the Executive Branch which grew out of the Hoover Commission of the previous Democratic Administration.

3. It overhauled tax laws.

4. It enacted flexible price supports in five basic crops and reduced dairy supports.

5. It made certain extensions in Social Security coverage and increased the benefits.

6. It authorized construction of the St. Lawrence seaway.
7. It defeated the Bricker amendment.
8. It terminated federal rent control.
9. It continued substantial foreign aid programs.
10. The Senate censured Senator McCarthy.

In the 84th Congress, a 1955-1956 Democratic Congress under a Republican Administration here is the list:

1. It authorized the President to defend Formosa and the Pescadores.
2. It ratified the SEATO Treaty.
3. It raised minimum wages from 75¢ an hour to $1.00.
4. It passed a housing bill.
5. It set up the soil bank.
6. It established under Social Security a new program for the disabled and reduced the eligibility age for women from 65 to 62.
7. It authorized grants for medical research facilities.
8. It set in motion a 13-year $30 billion road building program.
9. It authorized construction of an atomic merchant ship.
10. It continued substantial foreign aid programs.

For the 85th, 1957-1958, here is the list of the legislation of adjustment:

1. It established the Space Agency.
2. It approved a major military reorganization.
3. It extended unemployment benefits for 16 weeks.
4. It authorized a National Defense Education program.
5. It increased Social Security benefits.
6. It came to the aid of the railroads with a loan-guarantee program.
7. It voted Alaska statehood.
8. It enacted an emergency Housing act.
9. It legislated a requirement for full disclosure of pension funds.
10. It passed a mid-east resolution.
11. It approved the first civil rights measure in 82 years.
12. It approved the Atoms-for-Peace Program under the new International Atomic Energy Agency.
13. It continued substantial foreign aid programs.

Then, Mr. President, for the last Eisenhower Congress, the 86th, 1959-1960, here is the record:

1. It passed another Civil Rights bill.
2. It authorized another housing program with emphasis on low-cost housing.

3. It authorized funds for the study of mass transit problems.
4. It ratified the Anarctic Treaty.
5. It began a new program of aid for Latin America.
6. It approved Hawaiian statehood.
7. It approved a labor-management disclosure act.
8. It approved a constitutional amendment giving the vote in Presidential elections to the citizens of the District of Columbia.
9. It continued foreign aid programs.
10. The Senate restored the cloture rule to what it had been in 1948--to 2/3 present and voting rather than to a Constitutional two-thirds.

That is the record, Mr. President, of the Congresses from the end of World War II to the inception of the Kennedy Administration. When all else recedes into history, when the newspapers of the times yellow on the library shelves, when all years roll into the good old days, these are the measures, beyond the routine, which will count in terms of the shaping of the nation and of its place in the world. And it is largely on the basis of this legislation of adjustment that the historical judgments will be made. The number of significant measures is not great in these pre-Kennedy Congresses. The range is from 7 or so in the two years of the 80th Congress to a high of 13 or so during the two years of the exceptional 85th Congress under the leadership of the distinguished Vice President (Mr. Johnson). For the most part, each two years witnessed the enactment of a total of eight or

nine items and most of them elaborations or variations on themes already set in preceding years.

We come now, Mr. President, to the record of the 87th Congress, the first Congress of the Kennedy Administration. Here, then, is the comparable list.

1. It passed the omnibus farm bill to reduce surpluses and to provide for a new land-use adjustment program.

2. It authorized a program of health aid for migrant farm workers.

3. It extended unemployment benefits an additional 13 weeks.

4. It provided a program of aid to dependent children of the unemployed.

5. It increased minimum wages from $1.00 to $1.25 and extended coverage to several million additional workers.

6. It established the Area Redevelopment Program.

7. It increased old age insurance benefits and provided for retirement of men at 62 and liberalized disability payments.

8. It authorized almost $5 billion in new funds under the Omnibus Housing Act.

9. It extended the efforts to control water pollution.

10. It established the Manpower Training program.

11. It accelerated the public works program by an authorization of $900 million.

12. It made a significant revision in the tax structure.
13. It authorized direct loans for housing for the elderly.
14. It provided for voluntary pensions plans under the tax laws.
15. It enacted the Trade Expansion Program.
16. It passed the Communications Satellite bill.
17. It established the Peace Corps.
18. It established the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
19. It created the U.S. Travel Service.
20. It authorized the purchase of U.N. bonds to save that organization from bankruptcy.
21. It initiated a federal program on juvenile delinquency.
22. It provided a program of aid for educational TV in the schools and colleges.
23. It ratified the Treaty of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
24. It approved a constitutional amendment abolishing the poll tax.
25. It passed a substantial aid bill.
26. The Senate invoked cloture for the first time in several decades.

Mr. President, I will not draw comparisons between the 87th Congress and those which preceded it. Each Congress has its own challenges. Each does the best it can. But I will say to every Member of this body, this is the record that counts most. This is the record which you made.

It is not the record of the Majority Leader or the Minority Leader. It is the Senate's record and as the Senator from Montana, I, for one, will not make light of these achievements in the first two years of the Kennedy Administration. And the achievement is no less because the 87th Congress did not meet at all hours of the night, because it rarely titillated the galleries or because it failed to impress the visiting newsmen and columnists.

And now, Mr. President, we come to the 88th Congress and particularly to this Senate. We come to this Senate which some have already consigned to the wasteheaps of history. We come to its leadership which some find is to be pitied if, indeed, it is not to be scorned.

Here, Mr. President, I will include in the list--in the list of the significant legislation of adjustment--not only those measures which have cleared the Congress but also items which have at least cleared the Senate and are awaiting final action. Congress is not for one year. It is for two. What this Congress will in the end produce we cannot say until this Congress comes to an end some time in 1964. But to date in this Congress and in this Senate, here is the list:

1. It has initiated a program which begins to recognize the full dimensions of major health problems of the nation and to come to grips with them--mental illness and mental retardation.

2. It has expended federal aid for maternal and child-health services and for crippled children.

3. It has acted to forestall what would otherwise have been a crippling railroad shutdown.

4. It has acted to provide for a vast expansion in training and research facilities in medicine, dentistry and related sciences.

5. It has acted to expand academic facilities in higher education through grants and loans for construction.

6. It has acted to expand vocational education and extended for three years the National Defense Education Act and the impacted areas program.

7. It has acted on the problem of mass transit.

8. It has acted to establish a domestic peace-corps.

9. It has acted to establish a system of federal public defenders.

10. It has acted to create a youth conservation corps.

11. It has acted on a Water Resources Research program.

12. It has acted to preserve Wilderness areas.

13. It has acted to expand the area redevelopment program.

14. It has acted on the problems of air and water pollution.

15. It has authorized a substantial foreign aid program.

That is the record, Mr. President, at the half-way mark in the 88th Congress. And once again I will leave it to others who are so inclined to draw comparisons with past Congresses. But I will say that no Senator need be ashamed of this record. The record is no less a record because it has taken ten months of work to achieve. It is no less a record because it has been produced by cooperation, because the leadership wields no whip and seeks no whip to wield. And the record is for one year not for the two to which every Congress is entitled.

However this midway Congress may compare with what has gone before, the leadership would be the first to recognize that there are inadequacies in it. And the most serious, in my judgment, are neither the status of the Civil Rights bill nor the Tax bill. The most serious, in my judgment, have to do with the day-to-day financial housekeeping of the government. We have got to face the fact that if we are going to have an orderly fiscal administration of this government we cannot long continue with the practice of raising every few months, as a ritual, the legal debt ceiling. Nor can we expect a rational administration of the vast and far-flung activities of the Executive Branch of this government if the basic appropriations bills do not become law until months after the fiscal year begins.

I do not know where the answer to these problems lies. I do not blame the House and I most certainly cannot blame the Senate which must await the completion of House action on legislation of this type before considering it. And how the Senate is going to discharge its constitutional responsibilities on appropriations bills by July 1, the beginning of the fiscal year, when some of the bills do not reach the Senate until long after the 30th of June, I do not know. This year, for example, the D.C. appropriations arrived in the Senate Committee on the 15th of July. The military construction appropriation has just arrived. And the foreign aid appropriation has not even yet started its journey to the Senate.

I want to say again that I do not place the responsibility for this breakdown on the House and even less do I place it on the Senate Appropriations Committee.

Whatever the causes, and they are varied, the problem is still there. It has been growing worse over the years and if it is not faced soon, it will be a standing invitation to national financial chaos. Perhaps, what the distinguished Senator from Georgia (Mr. Russell) has suggested on occasion, along the lines of dividing the initiative on appropriations measures between the House and Senate may provide at least a partial solution. Perhaps, what the distinguished Senator from Washington (Mr. Magnuson) has proposed in the way of a division of the Congressional year between a legislative and an

appropriating session may be helpful. Or perhaps the problem is even more fundamental. Perhaps, it is the persistance of the illusion of a seven months Congress in a 12 months nation which is at the root of the difficulty and with this illusion, the incongruity of a June 30th fiscal closing in a December 31st government and nation.

Whatever the difficulty, we are and have been for some years, I repeat, on a course of increasing disorderliness in the management of the fundamental fiscal affairs of the government. I, for one, would welcome an initiative from the Administration and the relevant Committees looking to the establishment of a special Commission to explore this problem and to come up with recommendations for its solution. The job needs to be done and it needs to be done quickly.

If the Senate is not wholly at fault with regard to the appropriations situation, neither is it wholly at fault with regard to such measures as Health care and the Tax bill. I deeply regret the fact that the Tax bill to which the President rightly attaches such great importance has yet to be considered and disposed of. But, again, Mr. President, I will not point the finger of a prejudiced scorn at the distinguished Senator from Virginia (Mr. Byrd). Again, the Constitution and the practice require the House to complete its work

on a measure of this kind before the Senate begins consideration. And the House was eight long months in completing action on the Tax bill. I do not criticize the House. That body has its responsibilities. It may be that it was illusory in the first place to anticipate a rapid consideration of a bill of this complexity.

And if I do not criticize the House, I most certainly will not criticize the Finance Committee of the Senate if it, as it will, in a far shorter time, reports this bill to the Senate. May I say, further, that regardless of his personal attitude on this bill, I have every confidence that the distinguished Chairman of the Finance Committee (Mr. Byrd) will report it as quickly as the work of his committee can be completed.

Here again, Mr. President, as in the case of appropriations, we have got to face the fact that the Congress, under the Constitution and its established procedures is not basically equipped to respond, to reach a decision one way or another, on urgent matters which go to the heart of our national economic structure. And in all honesty, we have got to face the fact that in this instance, a failure to respond with some degree of urgency to an urgent Presidential request consigns to the Congress--to the whole Congress--a great responsibility for whatever consequences flow to the nation from this failure.

I turn next, Mr. President, to the civil rights measure. Here, too, Mr. President, there has been a prolonged delay in coming to grips with an issue which the President placed before us on the basis of urgency. Insofar as this delay is attributable to the Senate, I assume full responsibility. It has been the announced intention of the Leadership to await a bill from the House on this measure rather than to seek to proceed independently on a separate Senate bill. The hope was to simplify and to reduce the procedural gamut which--as every Member knows--must be run by any such bill in the Congress and, particularly, in the Senate. The hope was that by awaiting House action we would have been enabled--as a body--to face this issue, as indeed it must be faced, whole and directly, on its merits and resolve it more quickly.

But the House action has been a long time in coming. It may be that, in the end, the Leadership will have to suggest alternative approaches to the Senate. However that may be, the issue will be faced and it will be faced whole by this Senate in this Congress. Regardless of political consequences, we cannot ignore, we cannot turn our back on a matter whose long neglect has not only brought us to the edge of and over the edge of street-violence, but an issue which has seared the conscience of the nation deeply and opened up fundamental questions which we have not heretofore had the courage or the inclination to ask ourselves.

That is the story of the legislative state of the Congress during the Kennedy Administration and, particularly, of the Senate, as the Majority Leader sees it. It is a barebones story, without embellishment. It is a story written by all the Members and not by the Leadership. It is a story of the facts--the significant and enduring facts--as one Senator sees them at the midpoint of the 88th Congress.

Let me turn briefly, now, to another matter, to the matter which is before the Rules Committee, a matter which has cast a shadow of uncertainty over the Senate. I do not presume to look down upon any man from some Olympian height of a superior morality. Most certainly will I not do so when we ourselves are largely to blame for the difficulties which have arisen because it is we who are responsible as a body and we provided little guidance in these matters to staff officials of the Senate. Can we say in good conscience that we made it clear that in the Senate we demanded more of ourselves and, hence, expected more of all those associated with us in the higher interests of this institution and the nation which it serves?

That, Mr. President, is the deeper question which is before the Rules Committee. And the answer which we give to it will affect this institution more deeply and for a long time after the sensationalism of the moment is forgotten.

I turn, finally, to the recent criticism which has been raised as to the quality of the leadership. I do not question the right of anyone to raise this question--certainly not the right of the Senate and the press, to do so. I regard every Member with respect and esteem and every Member in his own way has reciprocated that sentiment, and I am sure that no Member intends to do me ill. As for the press, it has been invariably fair, even kind, in its treatment of me personally. I have never been misquoted on any remarks I have made in the Senate and only on rare occasions have I been misinterpreted and, even then, understandably so.

Of late, Mr. President, the descriptions of the Majority Leader, of the Senator from Montana, have ranged from a benign Mr. Chips, to glamourless, to "tragic mistake." I have not yet seen "wet-nurse of the Senate" but that, too, may not be long in coming.

It is true, Mr. President, that I have taught school, although I cannot claim either the tenderness, the understanding or the perception of Mr. Chips for his charges. I confess freely to a lack of glamour. As for being a "tragic mistake," if that means, Mr. President, that I am neither a circus ring-master, the master of ceremonies of a Senate night club, a tamer of Senate lions, or a wheeler and dealer, then I must accept, too, that title. Indeed, I must accept it, if I am expected as Majority Leader to be anything other than myself--a Senator from Montana who has had the good fortune to be trusted by his people for over two decades and done the best he knows how to represent them, and to do what he believes to be right for the nation.

Insofar as I am personally concerned, these or any other labels can be borne. I achieved the height of my political ambitions when I was elected Senator from Montana. When the Senate saw fit to designate me as Majority Leader, it was the Senate's choice not mine and what the Senate has bestowed, it is always at liberty to revoke.

But so long as I have this responsibility, it will be discharged to the best of my ability by me as I am. I would not, even if I could, presume to a tough-mindedness which, with all due respect to those who use this cliche, I have always had difficulty in distinguishing from soft-headedness or simple-mindedness. I shall not don any Mandarin's robes or any skin other than that to which I am accustomed in order that I may look like a Majority Leader or sound like a Majority Leader--however a Majority

Leader is supposed to look or sound. I am what I am and no title, political face-lifter, or image-maker can alter it.

I believe that I am, as are most Senators, an ordinary American with a normal complement of vices and, I hope, virtues, of weaknesses and, I hope, strengths. As such, I do my best to be courteous, decent and understanding of others and sometimes fail at it. But it is for the Senate to decide whether these characteristics are incompatible with the Leadership.

I have tried to treat others as I would like to be treated and almost invariably have been. And it is for the Senate to decide, too, whether that characteristic is incompatible with the Senate Leadership.

I have done my best to serve the people whom I represent and, at the same time, to exercise such independent judgment as I may have as to what is best for the nation as a whole, on national and international issues. If that is incompatible with the Senate leadership that, too, is for the Senate to decide.

I have always felt that the President of the United States--whoever he may be--is entitled to the dignity of his office and is worthy of the respect of the Senate. I have always felt that he bears a greater burden of responsibility than any individual Senator for the welfare and security of the nation. For he alone can speak for the nation abroad, and he alone, at home, stands with the Congress as a whole, as constituted representatives of the entire American people. In the exercise of his grave responsibilities, I believe we have a profound responsibility to give him whatever understanding and support we can, in good conscience and in conformity with our independent duties. I believe we owe it to the nation of which all our states are a part--particularly in matters

of foreign relations--to give to him not only responsible opposition but responsible cooperation. If these concepts, too, are incompatible with the Majority Leadership, then that, too, is for the Senate to decide.

And, finally, within this body I believe that every Member ought to be equal in fact no less than in theory, that they have a primary responsibility to the people whom they represent to face the legislative issues of the nation. And to the extent that the Senate may be inadequate in this connection, the remedy lies not, in the seeking of short-cuts, not in the cracking of non-existent whips, not in wheeling and dealing, but in an honest facing of the situation and a resolution of it by the Senate itself, by accommodation, by respect for one another, by mutual restraint and, as necessary, adjustments in the procedures of this body.

I have been charged with lecturing the Senate. And perhaps these remarks will also be interpreted in this fashion. But all I have tried to do is state the facts on this institution as I see them. The Constitutional authority and responsibility does not lie with the leadership. It lies with all of us individually, collectively, and equally. And in the last analysis, deviations from that principle must in the end act to the detriment of the institution. And, in the end, that principle cannot be made to prevail by rules. It can prevail only if there is a high degree of accommodation, mutual restraint and a measure of courage--in spite of our weaknesses--in all of us. It can prevail only, if we recognize that, in the end, it is not the Senators as individuals who are of fundamental importance. In the end, it is the institution of the Senate. It is the Senate itself as one of the foundations of the Constitution. It is the Senate as one of the rocks of the Republic.

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STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA)

DEFENSE AND MR. McNAMARA

Mr. President:

For some time the Government Operations Committee has been inquiring into the circumstances surrounding the award of a contract for development of the T.F.X. plane. What will emerge from this investigation, what legislation will derive from it, cannot be foreseen. It is not my intention to anticipate, much less to prejudge the Committee's findings. But whatever the outcome, let there be no doubt as to the interest of the Senate in this matter. It is an entirely appropriate and pertinent interest.

Public funds are spent in vast sums for military research and development. Together with the President, it is the Congress which provides the legal basis for the procedures under which these funds are expended. It is the Congress which appropriates these funds. It is the Congress which must answer to the people as to the general wisdom of the appropriations. And in part at least, the Congress must answer for the effectiveness with which these appropriations are disbursed by the Executive Branch. The very process of Committee inquiry, moreover, has significant value in an educative sense. And in the end that which may be learned in this or any particular case could well have wider legislative application. In inquiring deeply into the T.F.X. matter, therefore, the Committee on Government Operations is discharging a wholly legitimate function by authority of and on behalf of the Senate.

May I say that what has transpired to date in the investigation has led me to take the floor today. I do so to give voice to the views of one Member of the Senate, a Senator from Montana. The views are not new. Rather, they are views which have accumulated over the years and have begun to crystalize in the light of developments in the T.F.X. inquiry.

It is apparent from these hearings, that an immense number of factors were involved in the T.F.X. contract award. Some of these factors are of a military nature. Others are broader than military in their implications. And many are not open or shut tangibles but, rather, involve best judgments on the part of the men who are expected by the nature of the responsibilities entrusted to them to make best judgments.

Since such is the case, I do not believe that it is reasonable to expect any Senator or Committee of Senators to say with certainty that Secretary McNamara's decision in the T.F.X. was the right one or the wrong one. Nor do I believe that the spokesman of any particular branch of the Armed Services is competent to say with certainty that the Secretary's decision was the right one or the wrong one. Nor, in the light of the factors involved, are all of the spokesmen of the military services combined competent to do so. To be sure, their professionalism gives great weight to such objective military opinions as they may advance. But we should not overlook the fact that their very professionalism compels them to regard the development of a piece of military equipment, not in the context of total costs and national policies but largely in terms of military desirability and specific utility and, perhaps, even more pointedly, in terms of military desirability and specific utility as seen against a background of a particular training and service experience. That is as it should be. Military leaders are not required and ought not to be required to answer

the questions of the people of this nation as to the additional tax burdens or the neglected civilian needs which any military cost may entail. But these questions must be answered by someone in this government. Indeed, they must be answered by the President and by the Congress. And because that is the case and must remain so under a system of free and responsible government, it is not appropriate and it may be misleading to weigh military observations on any weapons-system in a vacuum and to assume that decisions arrived at on that basis are automatically the valid decisions.

Even Mr. McNamara, the Secretary of Defense, with all due respect, cannot speak with certainty as to the correctness of his decisions in the T.F.X. matter. Only time, if even that, will permit a logical assessment of his specific judgments.

The truth is that there are no certainties in matters of this kind.

T.F.X. apart, I am inclined to think--and I reason now from history rather than specifics--that at some future date it will be seen in retrospect that Mr. McNamara made many correct decisions as Secretary of Defense and occasionally that he made wrong decisions. But for the present, all that can be asked, all that should be asked, of any man in his position is that, under the President, he exercise every diligence and full dedication to his public responsibility and do his best to reach the best decisions.

On that score, Mr. McNamara needs no defense from me or anyone else. His record speaks for itself. His is, in these times, the most difficult and the most complex assignment in the government after the President. His immense international responsibilities which dovetail with those of the Secretary of State involve questions of life or death for tens of millions in this country and elsewhere.

In addition, he has the supreme administrative responsibilities for the Defense Establishment. That Department now contains a million civilian employes and more than two and a half million men and women in uniform.

Reposed in him is the trust of dispensing public funds in excess of $50 billion a year, a sum equal to more than the total of all other federal expenditures combined.

In the light of these vast responsibilities, Secretary McNamara has been an outstanding and exceptional servant of the people of this nation. He was a tower of strength to the late President in carrying the great burdens of Chief Executive. His remaining in office at the request of President Johnson is an assurance to the nation that we will continue to have the highest possible degree of intelligent, experienced and dedicated public service in this most critical Cabinet position.

Mr. McNamara was confirmed by the Senate as Secretary of Defense to see to it that this nation has the kind of defense structure which the President, together with the Congress, deem necessary for national security. He was confirmed by the Senate to bring about and maintain that structure at the lowest possible cost to the people of the United States. That--no more, no less--is what the law, the Constitutional powers of the Presidency, and the dimensions of the office of Secretary of Defense require of him. And I should think that every Member of this body would want to consider a long time, a very long time, before seeking to require anything else of this Secretary of Defense or any other. I should think, too, that we would want to consider a long time, a very long time, before curbing or undermining the authority of the office of the Secretary of Defense in view of the critical decisions which must be made if this responsibility is to be effectively exercised.

If the Secretary of Defense does not have the authority to make the critical decisions where else shall it be lodged in this government? What shall we require of the Secretary if it is not the critical decisions? That he serve as a kind of coach or water-boy or, perhaps, a chaplain for the military services? That the final decisions, not merely those of the battlefield but of defense management and technology in effect, shall be made by military personnel? If I may be blunt, Mr. President, it would appear, in that concept, that the Secretary's principal functions would be reduced to fighting for the Defense Establishment's share of the total national budgetary pie and then to keeping the various services from coming to blows over how it is to be divided. If I may be blunt, in prior years we have had our experience with that kind of an approach.

Indeed, the Secretary of Defense is a sort of umpire. But the fact is that the present Secretary of Defense is an umpire who has sought increasingly to establish service-needs and expenditures on the basis of the requirements of total national policies and in response to the admonitions of the Congress for economic and efficient operation of the Defense Establishment. He is an umpire who has exercised the authority of his office to say, not only "yes," but "no," when necessary, and to make the "no" stick. He has exercised the power to say "no," increasingly, to curb that notorious invitation to waste and extravagence, the cost-plus contract. He has exercised the power to say "no" to budgetary requests from the various services which often and understandably are heavily influenced by a one-service rather than an all-service concept of national defense. He has exercised the power to say "no" to separate service purchase of common use items of equipment and supply. And the Congress knows that this type of purchasing did much to bring about the stockpiling of military surpluses,

surpluses whose costs dwarf even those engendered in agriculture. He has exercised the power to say "no" to certain new weapons developments. However, any such development may intrigue its advocates, from the national point of view it ought not to be pursued unless it contains sufficient promise and can otherwise justify itself on the basis of cost-to-potential contribution to total defense. And lest there be any doubt of the need of such curbs, I shall read to the Senate a list of projects and their cost to the public--projects which over the past ten years did indeed intrigue their advocates but which were abandoned before completion or declared obsolete or surplus soon after completion.

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The total cost of these abandoned projects in the past ten years is over $5 billion. To be sure, some value, some experience, may well have been obtained from each of them. But let there be no mistake about it. Taken together they are indicative, to say the least, of an immense and conspicuous consumption of the nation's supply of talent and facilities for research and development. For this technological high-living, it is the people of the United States who must pick up the check in actual military costs and in the incalculable costs of a distorted usage of scarce scientific and technological resources.

Taken together these abandoned projects have represented, too, a major factor in running up the accumulation of surplus and obsolescent property by the armed services. For years in the past the total of such property disposed of at a fraction of cost has fluctuated between $4 billion and $8 billion annually. To put this figure in some kind of perspective, consider that it means that every year our military establishment got rid of, at a fraction of cost, assets with a value anywhere from about equivalent to, to double the amount that the United Kingdom expends on all its armed services for all purposes. In short, the British have been running their Army, Navy and Air Forces year in and year out for something less than the cost to us of our annual losses through excess military accumulations or obsolescence.

Mr. President, the Secretary of Defense, has, indeed, said "no" with frequency during the three years in which he has been in office. Yet there is nothing to suggest that because he has done so our defense position in the world is any less effective, any less impressive than heretofore. On the contrary, such indications as there are suggest that the Defense Establishment is better prepared and more capable of meeting a wider range of possible military challenges to this nation.

There is a good deal of talk about the high cost of government and the need to cut expenditures. In the light of this talk, I cannot imagine that anyone in the Senate would wish to undermine the Secretary's authority to say "no" to the ever-present and immense bureaucratic pressures for expenditures within the Defense Establishment. To be sure we can chop away at almost any item in the budget. The Department of State, for example, had a budget request for $374 million this year and a show of economy can be made by reducing it and closing a few consulates abroad in the process. But we are deluding ourselves if we believe for one moment that it will be possible to curb the growth in the cost of the federal government, let alone reduce that cost significantly unless someone has the authority, under the President, to act decisively in connection with defense expenditures. For that is where the great expenditures are. In the 1964 budget, for example, $53.7 billion was proposed by the President for the Defense Establishment. The next allocation in size in that budget was $11.3 billion for Treasury, and of this total $10.2 billion represents an allocation for interest on the public debt.

I ask the Senate to note, further, that the figure of $53.7 billion in new obligational authority for the Defense Department represented the final figure proposed in the budget submitted to Congress early this year. But before it was arrived at, Secretary McNamara had pared down requests from all of the individual military services under his supervision. When these individual requests initially reached his desk they totaled the great sum of $67 billion. In other words, Mr. President, the services, left to their own individual devices, would have sought of the Congress $13.3 billion more than the Secretary of Defense, in the end, allowed them to ask. And yet in spite of this enormous cut, the $53.7 billion requested for the armed services for fiscal year 1964 was still a record high.

With all due respect, would the President have been in a position to direct, except arbitrarily, a cut of $13.3 billion in the combined requests of the various services? With all due respect, would this body or even its exceptionally capable Armed Services Committee have been able to say "no", with any degree of confidence, to the tune of a reduction of $13.3 billion? Would the equivalent body in the House? With all due respect, I think the Congress would have had great difficulty in knowing where to enter the jungle of Defense finance and I doubt that we would have gone much beyond the fringes for fear of jeopardizing the necessary defense of the nation.

And, so, Mr. President, we are back to a Secretary of Defense with authority. If we did not have one he would have to be invented.

I am persuaded that we have in office an exceptional Secretary of Defense who is attempting to meet the full responsibilities of that office. I believe that he is exercising with great determination, intelligence and knowledge the authority which must go with those responsibilities.

It would seem to me that we ought to do whatever we are able to do to help him in his responsibilities. For we are all in agreement that we are seriously challenged by Communist power from abroad in a military sense as well as in other ways. We are all in agreement that against the military challenge there must be posed the necessary military defense for the security of the nation, at whatever the cost.

But the extent of the challenge from abroad is a variable depending upon changes in the world situation. The phrase "necessary military defense" is a variable, subject in interpretation to infinite extension.

And the phrase "at whatever the cost" is a blank cheque which if taken in a literal sense, can be drawn, in the end, upon the total resources of the people of the United States.

These are realities, Mr. President, which are just beginning to dawn upon us. These are realities with which, I believe, the present Secretary of Defense is seeking to grapple. These are realities to which, as legislators, we must turn our attention. It seems to me that we must begin to think deeply as to how the dimensions of "necessary military defense" may be drawn and redrawn more accurately in the light of an ever-changing international situation. And we must ask ourselves, too, how are we to keep "whatever the cost" of that necessary defense at a rational level in order that, in the end, it does not overwhelm the nation.

These are not empty questions nor are they theoretical questions. "Necessary defense" has been defined and redefined consistently over the past decade as more and more. "Whatever the cost" has risen from $37.8 billion in fiscal 1954 to the $53.7 billion which was requested for fiscal 1964. And the latter figure, as already noted, was presented to the Congress after the Secretary of Defense had reduced the initial service requests of $67 billion by $13.3 billion.

May I say that it is understandable if, in defining the dimensions of necessary military defense, those who have direct military responsibility are inclined to leave a margin for safety. That is appropriate; it is proper; it is to be commended rather than criticized. After all, those who have these responsibilities are grappling in an area which is both inexact and ever-changing and one which is not subject, in the end, to computer-calculation.

I, for one, do not begrudge the cost of a margin for extra safety--a substantial margin--and I believe the people of the nation

are similarly inclined. But the problem still remains. We must be ever-mindful lest in determining what is necessary for military defense we become so obsessed with the extra margin for safety that it grows into a fear-fed monster which, in the end, devours that which it is designed to safeguard.

In the same fashion, our willingness to pay "whatever the cost" of necessary defense must not be an invitation to acquiesce in administrative procedures within the defense establishment which tend toward wasteful rather than prudent expenditures. And I would emphasize that in this area--in the area of management procedures--there is no excuse for an excessive margin of safety. Expenditures for the management of the defense establishment, unlike the determination of over-all defense needs, can be subject to reasonably exact control by computer-calculation, by accounting procedures and by the many other tools of modern American business management.

If I may sum up, Mr. President, two questions ought to be ever-present in our minds in considering any problem of defense:

1. How are we to insure that this government defines and redefines "necessary military defense" with full adequacy but without fantastic and obsessive excess, in a world situation in which "necessary defense" is an ever-changing but not necessarily an ever-increasing quantity?

2. How are we to design the procedures within this government and within the Defense establishment so that they will provide this fully adequate necessary defense at the least cost to the people of the nation who, in the end, must pay for it?

There is no formula by which these questions may be answered. For years, we have been ordering and re-ordering the processes of the Executive Branch, in order that that branch may define more accurately for the President the nature of the international dangers which confront us. For years we have been ordering and re-ordering the structure of the Defense Department, in an effort to limit expenditures to the necessary. Yet year after year the problem has loomed larger.

If there is not an easy formula, there are certain negatives which might be examined for the light that they shed on what may stimulate defense costs far beyond the necessary. These are the things, it seems to me, we must not do, if we mean to keep a rational perspective on the realities which face us in the world and, in the light of them, hold expenditures for defense at a rational level consistent with national security. These negatives, these tentative observations, I should like to leave with the Senate in concluding my remarks.

In defining and redefining the dimensions of "what is necessary" for defense, we are likely to leave a most wasteful, rather than a desirable margin for safety unless these realities are recognized anew:

1. That, under our system of government, there can be no substitute for the preponderant judgments of the President as to the total and the ever-changing challenge from abroad to this nation. These judgments must provide the key for determining the essential dimensions of what is militarily necessary for the security of the nation.

2. That, in making his judgments, the President must necessarily depend on advice and counsel from whatever sources he deems appropriate--military and civilian--but once his judgments are made, it is inappropriate for any permanent official of the Executive Branch--military or civilian--to do other than his best to carry them into effect.

3. That the President's judgments--once made--in this connection are subject to challenge not by permanent officials of the Executive Branch--military or civilian--but only by the Congress, acting as the Constitution makes clear that it can and shall act, by legislative initiative and by legislative oversight.

4. That, under the President and the laws of the land, the Secretary of Defense has the authority to establish--with the help of the Joint Chiefs--the strategic concepts which shall set for all the armed services, their appropriate roles in maintaining the kind of defense which the President and the Congress have deemed necessary for the nation's security; and, further, that within the Defense Establishment, the Secretary of Defense has authority to control administrative procedures and practices for efficient and effective operations.

And if I may continue with the negatives, Mr. President, I should like also to stress that we are not going to get an effective and efficient defense at a tolerable cost unless it is recognized in all frankness:

1. That the Defense Establishment, as the largest single purchaser of goods and services in the nation, has come to occupy a substantial position in the civilian economy of this nation; that, in this connection, what the Defense Department does or does not do has come to have great importance not only for defense but for the well-being of business, labor and whole communities scattered throughout the nation.

2. That, in the light of this economic position which the Defense Establishment occupies it would be a gross naivete to assume that pressures--increasing pressures--will not be present for decisions to be made by the Defense Department not solely on considerations of necessary, effective and efficient defense--and may I say that colloquies on the floor between Senators from various of the larger states underscore this point.

3. That however understandable these pressures may be--and as a Senator from Montana I hope that I try to do as much for my state as any other Member--the nation will be ill-served if there is not within this government those attitudes and those conditions for administration of the affairs of the Defense Establishment which permit the decisions, in the end, to be made on the basis of necessary, effective and efficient defense.

Mr. President, in making these remarks today, I have not been unaware of the eloquent farewell address of the former President, Mr. Eisenhower, in which he warned of the need to guard against the development of an industrial-military complex of power in the nation. Nor have I been unmindful of dangers to that classic doctrine of freedom--the doctrine of civilian supremacy.

And yet, with all due respect, I do not see the principal difficulty which confronts us in these contexts. If there were ever to be an imminent danger to freedom in this nation of the kind alluded to by Mr. Eisenhower, it is not likely to be the cause of the failure of popularly responsible government. Rather it is likely to be the consequence of the failure of civilian responsibility in the Congress no less than in the Executive Branch of the government. And I want to say to the Senate, that this system of freedom which we know will not fail. It will not fail so long as an excessive fear does not drive us to an obsessive interpretation of what is necessary for defense. It will not fail if we are prepared to face the economic and social difficulties which confront the nation and deal with them on their own merits--their civilian merits--rather than to seek to evade them, or to act on them haphazardly and inadequately and ineffectively because we find it easier to act under the camouflage of an inflated concept of military necessity.

These, then, Mr. President, are some of the observations which I have to make. They are observations stimulated by the work of the T.F.X. inquiry which is being conducted by the very able Senator from Arkansas (Mr. McClellan) and his distinguished colleagues on the Government Operations Committee. They are observations growing out of a very high respect for the patriotic dedication and the ability with which Mr. McNamara is seeking to serve the nation under the President.

It is incumbent upon all of us, it seems to me, not to ignore these larger implications of the T.F.X. matter. It is incumbent upon us--the President, the Congress, the press and the people of the United States--to face them, to discuss them, and, as necesaary, to act on them within the Constitution.

Department of the Army
Projects Cancelled
(1953 - 1963)

Project Title	Year Cancelled	Funds Invested (Millions of Dollars)	Prime Contractors (s)
MISSILES			
DART	1958	44.0	Aerophysics Corp.

A wire-guided surface-to-surface antitank missile with a range of approximately 6,000 yards. This missile system was cancelled since the French designed SS-10 proved to be more effective in this role.

ORDNANCE, COMBAT VEHICLES AND RELATED EQUIPMENT			
VIGILANTE	1961	32.0	Sperry Gyroscope

A 6-barrel, 37mm automatic anti-aircraft gun system mounted on a full-track vehicle chassis and complete with radar fire control. This gun system was cancelled since the MAULER surface-to-air missile system has been designed and should be more effective in the anti-aircraft role intended.

OTHER EQUIPMENT			
AN/USD 4 Drone	1960	40.0	Republic Aviation

A medium endurance surveilliance drone, capable of carrying a 450 lb. pay-load for 55 minutes duration. This drone program was cancelled since it was considered that the AN/USD-5, when developed, could perform this mission as well.

AN/USD 5 Drone	1962	103.3	Fairchild Astro Corporation

A long-endurance surveillance drone, capable of carrying a 450 lb. pay-load for 90 minutes duration. This drone program was cancelled since cost effectiveness studies have indicated that the Air Force with their F4C and RF-101 modernization program can perform the mission more effectively.

Department of the Navy
Projects Cancelled
(1953 - 1963)

Project Title	Year Cancelled	Funds Invested (Millions of Dollars)	Prime Contractor(s)
AIRCRAFT:			
SEAMASTER	1959	330.4	Martin Co. Marlan Const. Co.

Jet powered mine laying seaplane. Specialized for low altitude attack against submarine pens. Cancelled because of technical problems, high cost and slippage in program.

MISSILES:			
REGULUS II	1958	144.4	Ling Tempco L.F. Stillwell & Co.

Surface-to-surface missile with 500 nautical mile range and weight of 11,570 lb. equipped with Shoran grid guidance. Cancelled because it became redundant when better systems were assured before its completion.

PETREL	1957	87.2	Fairchild A/C

Air-to-surface missile with 20 nautical mile range and weight of 3300 lbs. equipped with active radar homing plus acoustic torpedo. Cancelled for consideration of reasons including state-of-the-art advances, changing military requirements and cost considerations.

CORVUS	1960	80.0	Ling Tempco

Air-to-surface missile with 170 nautical mile range and weight of 1750 lbs. equipped with passive or semi-active radar homing. Cancelled for consideration of reasons including state-of-the-art advances, changing military requirements, cost considerations, plus contractor difficulties.

EAGLE	1961	53.0	Bendix Aviation

Air-to-air missile with 70 nautical mile range and weight of 1400 lbs. equipped with midcourse command plus active radar homing. Since this was the missile system for the Missileer aircraft, it was cancelled when Missileer was dropped.

Project Title	Year Cancelled	Funds Invested (Millions of Dollars)	Prime Contractor(s)
MISSILES:			
METEOR	1954	52.6	M. I. T.
	Air-to-air missile with 10 nautical mile range and weight of 510 lbs. and semi-active homing. Cancelled in weeding out of early air-to-air missile projects in favor of more promising air-to-air projects.		
RIGEL	1953	38.1	Grumman A/C
	Surface-to-surface missile with 400 nautical mile range and weight of 19,000 lbs. equipped with ramjet, command mid-course, plus radar homing. Cancelled for same weeding out process as METEOR above, plus it was a competitor to REGULUS.		
DOVE	1955	33.7	Eastman Kodak Co.
	Air-to-surface missile with gravity bomb and weight of 1300 lbs. equipped with infrared homing. Cancelled because of changing requirements plus technical difficulties.		
SHIPS:			
Submarine Underwater Propulsion Systems	1954	25.0	General Electric Allis-Chalmers Elliott Company Westinghouse Elec.
	Work began in 1945 and continued to 1954 on closed and semi-closed propulsion cycles, all of which could be used to propel submarines in fully submerged conditions. Cancelled because of the success of nuclear propulsion.		

Project Title	Year Cancelled	Funds Invested (Millions of Dollars)	Prime Contractor(s)
OTHER:			
NRRS, Sugar Grove	1962	70.0	Tidewater Constr. Co. Patterson-Emerson Constr.

A 600'diameter, rotatable radio antennae device to provide an improved capability in space research and intelligence gathering activities. Cancelled because costs increased from initial estimate of less than $80 million to over $190 million and, during the period when the structural design phase of the antennae was in progress, other scientific techniques capable of performing the antennae functions were perfected.

ZIP Fuel	1959	123.0	Callery Chem. Co.

Fuel of 50% higher energy than jet fuel, for use in gas turbines. Cancelled because of high cost and technical difficulties.

Department of the Air Force
Projects Cancelled
(1953 - 1963)

Project Title	Year Cancelled	Funds Invested (Millions of Dollars)	Prime Contractor(s)
AIRCRAFT:			
ANP	1961	511.6**	Boeing/Gen. Dyna. GE/P&W

This was a program to develop a nuclear-powered long-range, long endurance aircraft for possible strategic application. The program was cancelled because it had inadequate military potential in any form which was technically feasible.

F-108	1959	141.9	North American

This program was for development of a long-range (1000 mile) supersonic manned interceptor, equipped with a highly sophisticated fire control system, to counter the airborne bomber threat of the 1960's and 1970's. The overall program was cancelled because of the relative decrease of the manned bomber threat.

XF-103	1957	104.0	Republic

This was an advanced fighter concept for a titanium mach 3.0 fighter, powered by a dual cycle (turbojet/ramjet) propulsion system. It was cancelled primarily as a result of technical problems (e.g. poor visibility, J-67 engine problems) rising costs, and greater promise of the F-108 program (e.g. long range).

F-107	1957	100.0	North American

This was a fighter-bomber development program in competition with the F-105. It was cancelled in favor of the latter, which proved to be a superior weapon system.

J-83 Engines	1959	55.0	Fairchild

This was a small lightweight turbojet engine in the 2000 lb. thrust range, for possible missile or aircraft application. It was cancelled in favor of a competitively superior engine.

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* Tentative; pending termination proceedings.
** AF costs only.

Project Title	Year Cancelled	Funds Invested (Millions of Dollars)	Prime Contractor(s)
AIRCRAFT:			
C-132	1957	54.0	Douglas

This was a turboprop heavy long-range transport designed to carry 100,000 lb. payload. It was cancelled because of potential high cost and because the C-133, although not capable of as high a payload, appeared sufficiently versatile to meet Air Force needs.

T-61 Engine	1959	37.4	Allison

This was an internal combustion burboprop engine of advanced design. Cancellation was based on the fact that the engine had not been designated for application to any specific future weapon system.

H-16	1954	23.4	Vertol

This was an extremely large fuselage, twin-rotor, high capacity helicopter. Hampered by technical problems, delays and cost overrun, it was cancelled as a result of reappraisal following the crash of an experimental model.

MISSILES:			
NAVAHO	1957	679.8	North American

This was a supersonic surface-to-surface intercontinental strategic missile. It was cancelled in its flight test phase, having been overtaken by the accelerated ICBM development program.

SNARK	1962	677.4	Northrop

This was a subsonic surface-to-surface intercontinental strategic missile. Although completely developed and placed in the active inventory, it was rendered quickly obsolete by the accelerated ICBM program.

GAM-63 RASCAL	1958	448.0	Bell

This was an air-launched air-to-surface missile for use by strategic forces (B-47). The program was cancelled in favor of the inherently superior Hound Dog.

Project Title	Year Cancelled	Funds Invested (Millions of Dollars)	Prime Contractor(s)
MISSILES:			
GAM-87 Skybolt	1963	440.0*	Douglas

This was a ballistic missile to be air launched from the B-52 or British Vulcan bombers. Cost escalation, time delay, revised estimates of actual performanace, and availability of other ways to do the job better on a cost-effectiveness basis caused cancellation.

TALOS (Land Based)	1957	118.1	Bendix

This was a land-based surface-to-air missile for the air defense mission. Air Force effort terminated when short range surface-to-air missiles were designated as an Army sole responsibility.

Mobile MINUTEMAN	1962	108.4	Boeing

This program consisted of the present Minuteman surface-to-surface missile transported and fired from railroad cars. It was cancelled because of high cost and little military value versus other systems.

Q-4 DRONE	1959	84.4	Northrop

This was a small turbojet drone to be used by Air Defense Command for training. It was cancelled because of a lack of funds and a change in requirements.

SM-73 GOOSE	1958	78.5	Fairchild

This was a subsonic long range decoy missile for strategic application, to be ground launched as an electronic countermeasure device. The program was overtaken by other developments (e.g. GAM-72 Quail) and by changes in concept of operation.

GAM-67 CROSSBOW	1956	74.6	Northrop

This program was the original air-to-surface anti-radiation missile (ARM). The modern version is the SHRIKE. It was cancelled because other systems were considered more favorable and because of uncertainties in the guidance system.

Project Title	Year Cancelled	Funds Invested (Millions of Dollars)	Prime Contractor(s)
OTHER:			
AN/AIQ-27	1959	142.0	Sperry

This program was a complete integrated electronic countermeasures system for the B-52. It was cancelled because of the extreme cost.

Hi Energy Boron Fuel	1959	135.8**	Olin Mathieson, others

The program was for the development of fuel to power a Chemically Powered Bomber. It was cancelled because it was overtaken by other developments, because of technical problems encountered, and because the requirement was cancelled for the specific aircraft to which it had known application.